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No. I

GRAY VS. POWELL AND THE SCOPE OF REVIEW

Bernard Schwartz*
dissenting from the decision of the Supreme Court in a celebrated administrative-law case, Justice Jackson once declared:
"I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he
said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't•understand it.' " 1
It cannot be denied that the learned justice's reaction is one which
is often felt by students of Supreme Court jurisprudence. This
has been particularly true of the field involved in the case which
called forth Justice Jackson's plaint-i.e., that of administrative
law. American administrative lawyers have not infrequently had
this same response to decisions of the highest tribunal.
Among Supreme Court administrative-law decisions, few have
been better calculated to produce such response among the legal
profession than those involving the doctrine usually associated
with the case of Gray v. Powell. 2 That doctrine, as we shall see,
is one which is of basic importance in the law of judicial review
of agency action, for it drastically narrows the role of the reviewing court with regard to questions that appear to be more legal
than factual in nature. 3 What makes the doctrine especially difficult for students of administrative law, however, is the fact that
the Supreme Court has been (to put it mildly) inconsistent in
its application. There have been many cases since the doctrine
of Gray v. Powell was first enunciated, which would seem to be
governed by it, where the Court has simply not applied the doctrine. And, to make matters worse, the Court, in many of them,
has not seen fit to tell us why it was acting as it did or even, for
that matter, to mention the doctrine of Gray v. Powell at all. This
has led, not unnaturally, to the belief that the Court in this field

I
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• Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law, New York
University.-Ed.
1 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 214, 67 S.Ct.
1575 (1947).
2 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941).
3 The expression used by Murphy, J., in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S.
469 at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947).
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has been guided by purely discretionary factors - or, more bluntly,
by the arbitrary whims and caprices of the majority of the justices.
As one commentator expresses it, "The one statement that can be
made with confidence about applicability of the doctrine of Gray
v. Powell is that sometimes the Supreme Court applies it and
sometimes it does not. The criteria that guide the use or non-use
of the doctrine are exceedingly elusive. Many cases defy explanation except in terms of judicial discretion." 4
To the student of administrative law, the unexplained vagaries
of the Supreme Court in its application of the doctrine of Gray
v. Powell are most disturbing. The life of the law may not be
logic, but a legal system that is not logically consistent internally
leaves much to be desired. Whatever one may think of the merits
of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell, its application should be a consistent one. If, on the contrary, that doctrine is sometimes applied
and sometimes not,5 in cases that appear to be fundamentally alike,
then the law on· the subject is far from satisfactory. The evil
resulting from the high Court's inconsistency in applying a supposedly established doctrine is self-evident. If the application of
such doctrine in particular cases depends solely upon judicial
fancy, the law becomes, as Justice Roberts once expressed it, not
a chart to govern conduct, but a game of chance; instead of settling
rights and liabilities it unsettles them. Counsel and parties will
bring actions in the teeth of the accepted doctrine on the not
improbable chance that the doctrine will be thrown overboard.
Defendant agencies will not know whether to litigate or to settle
review actions, for they will have no assurance that the declared
rule will be followed. "But the more deplorable consequence will_
inevitably be that the administration of justice will fall into disrepute. Respect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the
public come to understand that nothing that has been said in
prior adjudication has force in a current controversy.'' 6
It is these implications of the Supreme Court jurisprudence
that have led the present writer to undertake, in this paper, a
reexamination of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. The primary
concern in doing this is to determine whether or not the inconsis. tencies of the Court already referred to in applying that doctrine
can be explained (at least in most cases) upon a rational basis.
4 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 893 (1951).
old. at 887.
6 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 at 112, 64 S.Ct. 455 (1944).
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But before such determination can be attempted, it is necessary
first to ascertain just what doctrine it was that the highest Court
enunciated in Gray v. Powell and what the effect of that doctrine
has been upon the scope of judicial review of administrative action.

Doctrine of Gray v. Powell
Gray v. Powell1 arose out of a petition to review an order of the
Director of the Bituminous Coal Division of the Department of
the Interior. Petitioners were the receivers of the Seaboard Air
Line Railway Company and as such were the holders of coal
leases on certain coal lands in Virginia and West Virginia from
which they were having coal mined by independent contractors.
The coal thus mined was used by petitioners in the operation of
the interstate railway system of which they were receivers. The
receivers, as producers of coal, filed an application under the
relevant section of the Bituminous Coal Act8 asking', that they be
held exempt from the price-fixing provisions of the act by reason
of the exemption contained therein, to the effect that such provisions "shall not apply to coal .consumed by the producer or to
coal transported by the producer to himself for consumption by
him." The receivers asserted that they were producer-consumers
within this provision and hence entitled to exemption from the
act. The director held that they were not "producers" consuming
their own product and issued an order denying the claimed exemption. It was this order that the receivers sought to have reviewed.
The Court of Appeals for the- Fourth Circuit reversed the
agency order, declaring that "the decision of the Director is not
supported by substantial evidence and is based upon error of law." 9
According to Circuit Judge Parker, the petitioners clearly were
"producers" of coal within the meaning of the exemption provision of the Coal Act. "For the purpose of the Act, we cannot
see what difference it makes whether the owner of a mine digs
the coal himself with his own organization or whether he has it
dug for him by an independent contractor, who assumes the risks
and responsibilities of that relationship. In either event, the owner
causes the coal to be mined and prepared for use.... If he sells
314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941).
50 Stat. L. 72, c. 127 (1937).
9 Powell v. Gray, (4th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 752 at 757.
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it, he should certainly be held subject to the regulatory provisions
of the Act; and if he consumes instead of selling it, there is as
much reason for exempting him from the regulatory provisions
in the one case as in the other."10 Since the agency construction
of the relevant statutory provision was, in the opinion of the court,
erroneous, its order could not stand.
That the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court
of appeals is less important than the reasons given for the Court's
action. Review of the agency conclusion that petitioners were not
producers is not to be based, as was the decision below, upon independent judicial determination of whether they came within
the statutory term. Instead, said Justice Reed, "In a matter left
specifically by Congress·to the determination of an administrative
body, as the question of exemption was here . . . , the function
of review placed upon the courts . . . is fully performed when
they determine that there has been a fair hearing, with notice and
an opportunity to present the circumstances and arguments to the
decisive body, and an application of the statute in a just and
reasoned manner."11
An agency determination like that at issue "belongs to the
usual administrative routine."12 Congress could itself have legislated specifically as to individual exemptions, but instead delegated that job to the administering agency. "Where, as here, a
determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclusion left
untouched. Certainly, a finding on Congressional reference that
an admittedly constitutional act is applicable to a particular situation does not require such further scrutiny. Although we have here
no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, that does not permit a court
to substitute its judgment for that of the Director."13
The sweep of the statutory term "producer," said Justice Reed,
must be left to the administrative agency. As in most cases, the
application of that term in a particular case is a matter of degree.
"The separation of production and consumption is complete when
a buyer obtains supplies from a seller totally free from buyer connection. Their identity is undoubted when the consumer extracts coal from its own land with its own employees. Between
10 Id.

at 756.
11314 U.S. 402 at 411, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941).
12Ibid.
13 Id. at 412.
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the two extremes are the innumerable variations that bring the arrangements closer to one pole or the other of the range between
exemption and inclusion. To determine upon which side of the
median line the particular instance falls calls for the expert, experienced judgment of those familiar with the industry. Unless
we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by the Commission14
to bring them within the concept 'producer' is so unrelated to the
tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect to
deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to
leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."15
Such, briefly stated, was the decision of the Supreme Court in
Gray v. Powell. Its importance lies in the Court's statement with
regard to the scope of review of the administrative finding that
the petitioners were not "producers" within the exemption provision of the relevant statute. The court of appeals had decided
that the agency had erred in its finding; in its opinion, those in
petitioners' position clearly were "producers" of coal consuming
their own product, even though the actual mining was carried on
by independent contractors. A similar position was taken in the
Supreme Court by three dissenting justices. According to Justice
Roberts, who delivered the dissenting opinion, "This court obviously fails in performing its duty and abdicates its function
as a court of review if it accepts, as the opinion seems to do, the
Director's definition of 'producer' and then proceeds to accommodate the meaning of related provisions to the predetermined definition. So to do is a complete reversal of the normal and usual
method of construing a statute."16 Where the agency construction
of the term "producer" is erroneous, it is the duty of the reviewing court to reverse its order. And, said Justice Roberts, that was
the case here. The agency finding was based upon the fact that
the coal in question was mined for it by people not its employees.
But, in the view of the dissenters, this made no difference. "The
only possible differentiation between the respondents' method of
conducting the business and that of the usual captive mine lies in
the fact that the respondents' coal is mined by an independent
14 It should be noted tbat tbe agency in Gray v. Powell before whom tbe hearing was
originally held was tbe National Bituminous Coal Commission. While tbe case was pending, it was abolished by presidential reorganization plan and its functions transferred to
tbe Bituminous Coal Division, headed by a director, set up in tbe Department of tbe
Interior. This explains why Justice Reed, in tbe quoted portions of his opinion, refers
both to the "director" and the "commission."
15 314 U.S. 402 at 413 (1941).
16 Id. at 420-421. Stone, C.J., and Byrnes, J., joined in the dissent.
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contractor instead of by employes. That circumstance, however,
will not justify the statement that respondents do not produce the
coal, any more than it would justify the statement that they would
not transport coal to themselves, within the meaning of the Act,
if they shipped it by a common carrier who was an independent
contractor. The circumstance that the coal is mined by a contractor instead of an employe, or transported by a common carrier,
cannot have any more, or any different, effect upon the subjects
of regulation - prices and unfair methods of competition - in the
one case than in the other."17
Both the decision of the court of appeals and the diss~nt in the
Supreme Court indicate that the Director of the Bituminous Coal
Division may well have been wrong in giving to the term "producer" the meaning which he had. In the opinion of the majority
of the Supreme Court, however, it does not follow from this that
his decision must necessarily be reversed. For Gray v. Powell stands
for the proposition that the test upon review is not the rightness
of the challenged administrative finding, but only its reasonableness.
In Gray v. Powell itself, it is at least arguable that the agency
determination was not right. The Court expressly stated that
that was not its concern upon review. The reviewing court can
reverse only when it "can say that a set of circumstances deemed
by the Commission to bring them within the concept 'producer'
is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment."18 In
such a case, it would seem that the administrative finding is not
only not right, but also not reasonable. Where, on the contrary,
the agency determination, though perhaps erroneous in the view
of the reviewing court, is a reasonable one, "it is the Court's duty
to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."19 It may be
going too far to assert, as did Justice Roberts in his dissent, that
the majority of the Court adopted its construction of the term
"producer" "apparently only because the Director has adopted
it,"20 but it is certainly true that, under the Court's reasoning,
it could not substitute its judgment for that of the director on
the proper construction of the statutory term. Even if the Court
11 Id. at
18 Id. at

421.
413.

l9Ibid.
20 Id. at

422.
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would have construed the term differently had the matter been
before it originally for decision upon its own independent judgment, it had to accept the agency construction, provided only that
it did not pass the bounds of reason.
Gray v. Powell thus lays down the doctrine that, on review, an
administrative construction of a statutory term like "producer"
will be upheld if it is rational even though the court might well
have construed the term differently on its own independent judgment. Chief Justice Vinson, in a later case applying the Gray v.
Powell doctrine, explained: "To sustain the Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result
we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. The 'reviewing court's function
is limited.' All that is needed to support the Commission's interpretation is that it has 'warrant in the record' and a 'reasonable
basis in law.' " 21

Scope of Review
To enable the reader adequately to understand the effect of
Gray v. Powell upon the law of judicial review of administrative
action, an introductory word must first be said about the scope
of review as it had been developed before the doctrine of that
case was articulated.
The question of the scope of review has been a crucial one in
American administrative law. Until a comparatively recent time,
indeed, the issue of proper scope was a highly controversial one.
But now, as Professor Davis puts it: "The long debate about de
novo review versus restricted review is about ended; the Ben
Avon and Crowell cases are of little interest except as history;
extremists have moved from both ends toward the middle; and the
substantial-evidence rule now dominates nearly all judicial review
of administrative action in the federal courts."22
The fact that present-day discussions of the scope of review are
no longer dominated by the heat of partisan controversy does not,
however, mean that that question is now of only academic importance. The revelation by Professor Davis of his own mental
21 Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 at
153-154, 67 S.Ct. 245 (1946).
22 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 868 (1951). The cases referred to by Professor Davis are
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920), and
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932).
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processes in writing up the subject for his treatise on administrative law is highly significant in this respect. "The easy supposition," he has stated, "was that the book . . . would include a
mere summary of the law concerning scope of review. But the
preparation of what started out to be such a summary has led to
the surprising discoveries that the heart of the scope-of-review
problem as of 1950 is inadequately treated by the literature and
that few branches of administrative law are more challenging."28
The basic importance of scope of review lies in the fact that
the extent of judicial inquiry in particular cases may determine
whether or not full effect is given to the legislative purpose in
creating administrative agencies. "One of the principal reasons
for the creation of such agencies is to secure the benefit of special
knowledge acquired through continuous experience in a difficult and complicated field.'' 24 If the review of administrative
determinations were to be very broad, with the reviewing court
deciding the case de novo on its independent judgment, "administrative tribunals would be turned into little more than media
for transmission of the evidence to the courts. It would destroy
the values of adjudication of fact by experts or specialists in the
field involved. It would divide the responsibility for administrative adjudications.''25
We should not forget that "in the whole of administrative law
the functions that can be performed by judicial review are fairly
limited.''26 The role of the courts in this field "is to serve as a
check on the administrative branch of government - a check against excess of power and abusive exercise of power in derogation
of private right.'' 27 The judicial fun~tion is thus one of control:
we can expect judicial review to check - not to supplant - administrative action. The province of the judge is to confine the
administrator within t~e bounds of legality, not to determine for
himself the wisdom of challenged administrative action.
At the same time, the limitations imposed on the scope of
inquiry of the reviewing court must not go so far as to prevent full
judicial scrutiny of the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to judicial review
28 Davis, "Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action," 50 CoL. L. REv. 559
(1950).
24 SEC v. Associated Gas and Electric Co., (2d Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 795 at 798.
25 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITfEE ON .ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 9192 (1941).
26Id. at 76.
27Ibid.
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can become but an empty form. "It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant. . . . It
reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint." 28
Law-fact distinction. The scope of review of administrative
action has been dominated by the distinction between "law" and
"fact" - a distinction that is fundamental throughout our law
and that has, indeed, been the keystone upon which our whole
system of appellate review has been built. As an English administrative lawyer put it, in this field, "it is generally agreed that the
jurisdiction of superior Courts should be invoked only on questions of law - a principle which is already familiar in other
spheres, such as appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal and cases
stated to the High Court by justices and other authorities of inferior jurisdiction. To re-open all disputed issues of fact might
lead to endless litigation, with no very satisfactory conclusion in
the end."29 As applied to the field of administrative law, this
separation of law and fact sounds attractively simple. "The administrative tribunal would find the facts and the courts would
not interfere unless the absence of evidence or the perversity of
the finding required them to intervene."30
The approach of our courts to the scope of review has been
based almost entirely upon the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact. As to the latter, the primary responsibility of decision is with1the administrative expert. It is only the
former that are to be decided judicially. "If the action rests upon
an administrative determination - an exercise of judgment in an
area which Congress has entrusted to the agency - of course it
must not be set aside because the reviewing court might have
made a different determination were it empowered to do so. But
if the action is based upon a determination of law as to which the
reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order
may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law."31
From a historical point of view, the use of the law-fact distinction in the field of review of administrative action was a wholly
natural development. When Anglo-American courts came to be
confronted with cases involving challenges to the legality of agency
28 Jackson, J., dissenting, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 at 210, 67 S.Ct. 1575
(1947).
29 Au.EN, LAW AND ORDERS 159 (1945).
30 CARR, CONCERNING ENGLISH Anl\UNISTRATIVE LAW 108 (1941).
31 SEC v. Chenery Corp.; 318 U.S. 80 at 94, 63 S.Ct. 454 (1943).
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acts, they had at their disposition the fully developed law of appellate review of lower courts as well as that governing the respective roles of judge and jury - both of which were grounded
entirely on the law-fact distinction. In evolving the law of agency
review, it was not suprising that our judges proceeded, so far as
possible, by analogy with the principles that had been constructed
so meticulously by their predecessors in the above-mentioned :fields,
and particularly that of appellate court review. In their origins,
indeed, cases involving review of agency action by the Court of
King's Bench appear to have been treated exactly like cases involving review of inferior courts by that tribunal. The prerogative ·writs
themselves, which became the basic non-statutory method of securing review of administrative acts in the common-law world, 32
were originally available only to control inferior courts. 33 When
those same writs began to be used as a means of controlling administrative agencies, it was natural for them to be governed by the
rules that applied when they were issued against lower courts including that limiting the scrutiny of the reviewing court to
questions of law.
The law-fact distinction, whose penetration into the law of
review of administrative action can thus be explained historically,
may also be said to have a significant practical basis in the :field of
administrative law. A theory of review grounded upon the distinction rests upon a division of labor between judge and administrator, giving full play to the particular competence of each.
Questions of law are to be decided judicially; for the judge, both
by training and tradition, is best equipped to deal with them.
"Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related
to a belief in their possession of expertness with regard to such
questions." 34 These considerations do not apply to the judicial
review of the factual issues arising out of administrative determinations. Thei::e, the advantages of expertise are with the administrator. The fact ":findings of an expert commission have a validity
to which no judicial examination can pretend; the decision, for
instance, of the New York Public Service Commission that a gas
32 Under Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U.S. 162, 33 S.Ct. 639 (1913), it should be noted,
certiorari, the most commonly used of the prerogative writs in this field, is not available
in the federal courts for the review of administrative action.
33 See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at 205.
34 LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 152 (1938). Emphasis omitted.
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company ought to provide gas service for a given district is almost inevitably more right than a decision pronounced by the
Courts in a similar case."35

Review of facts. The division of labor just referred to is not,
however, inexorably carried out, for constitutional principles require some judicial review upon fact as well as law. "An approach
to the problem of judicial review cannot neglect the fact that its
essence springs from the Anglo-American conception of the 'supremacy of law' or 'rule of law,' as it is variously called."36 That concept calls for a judicial examination of the administrative determination to see that it has an evidentiary basis. An administrative
finding of fact that is not supported by evidence cannot be said
to have been within the jurisdiction conferred upon the agency.
Or, to put it another way, "the question whether the administrative finding of fact rests on substantial evidence . . . is really a
question of law, for a finding not so supported is arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized."37
Nor should it be assumed that judicial inquiry into the evidentiary basis of administrative fact findings is inconsistent with the
law-fact distinction upon which, we have seen, the scope of review
of agency action has been grounded. The question of evidentiary
support itself is treated by the courts as one of law and hence one
to be determined by the court upon review. An agency finding
of fact made without any evidentiary basis is arbitrary and ultra
vires; the courts can consequently intervene since the primary
purpose of judicial review in our system is to keep administrative
agencies within the bounds of the powers delegated to them.
That this is, in fact, the approach of our courts is shown by Florida
East Coast Railway Co. v. United States. 38 There the Interstate
Commerce Commission had considered in the same proceeding
the question of reducing the rates on three railroads running
through the state of Florida. Although the evidence showed reduced costs on only two of the lines, the commission had included all three in its rate-reducing order. The Court set aside
the order in so far as it affected the third line, saying that there
was no evidence justifying that part of the order, for testimony
35 LAsKI, A GRAMMAR OF Por.mcs, 4th ed., 393 (1938).
36 LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 123 (1938).
37 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON AnlllINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

(1941).
38234 U.S. 167, 34 S.Ct. 867 (1914).
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as to the condition of traffic on certain lines did not necessarily
tend to establish similar conditions on another railroad in regard
to which no testimony was given. In the course of his opinion,
Chief Justice White declared, "While a finding of fact made by
the Commission concerning a matter within the scope of the authority delegated to it is binding, and may not be re-examined in
the courts, it is undoubted that where it is contended that an
order whose enforcement is resisted was rendered without any
evidence whatever to support it, the consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of law, which it is the
duty of the courts to examine and decide." 39
Though, as has just been shown, the reviewing court must thus
reexamine agency fact findings, this does not mean that such findings are to be treated like findings of law. On the contrary, there
is still an essential difference between the treatment, on review, of
questions of fact and questions of law. If a question of law is at
issue, the reviewing court must determine it upon its own independent judgment. Where the challenged finding is, on the other
hand, one of fact, the court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the administrator. It is not for the reviewing court to
determine the correctness of the administrative factual determination upon its own independent judgment. "The judicial function
is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the
conclusions approved by the administrative body."40 The court
has only to see if the finding is supported by evidence; it is not
concerned with the weight of the evidence. "In such cases, the
judicial inquiry into the facts goes no further than to ascertain
whether there is evidence to support the findings, and the question
of the weight of the evidence in determining issues of fact lies
with the legislative agency acting within its statutory authority." 41
It is interesting to note that, although the law of review of
administrative agencies developed, as we saw, from that governing
appellate review of inferior courts, there is little doubt but that
the scope of review of agency findings of fact became narrower
than that of similar findings by a trial judge. The fact finding of
an agency came to be treated, for purposes of the scope of review,
substantially like a special jury verdict and, under the law de39 Id. at 185. For a similar English approach, see Bean v. Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries, Ltd., [1944] 2 All ,E.R. 279 at 284.
40 Mississippi Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 at 286-287, 54 S.Ct. 692
(1934).
41 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 at 51, 56 S.Ct. 720 (1936).
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veloped by the federal courts, "evidence sufficient to support a
jury verdict or an administrative finding may not suffice to support
a trial judge's finding." 42 Justice Reed said, in a significant case,
"Since judicial review of findings of trial courts does not have
the statutory or constitutional limitations on judicial review of
findings by administrative agencies or by a jury, this Court may
reverse findings of fact by a trial court where 'clearly erroneous.' " 43 Where an administrative agency is involved, however,
· its findings of fact must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.
How does the substantial-evidence rule, which dominates the
scope of review of administrative findings of fact compare with
the "clearly erroneous" test which applies to appellate review of
the findings of a trial judge? "A finding is 'clearly erroneous,'"
said Justice Reed, in the case already referred to, "when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.''44 Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,45 review governed by the test of substantial
evidence was clearly narrower than this. Indeed, under a prevalent pre-APA interpretation of the substantial-evidence rule, "if
what is called 'substantial evidence' is found anywhere in the
record to support conclusions of fact, the courts are said to be
obliged to sustain the decision without reference to how heavily
the countervailing evidence may preponderate-unless indeed the
stage of arbitrary decision is reached. Under this interpretation,
the courts need to read only one side of the case and, if they find
any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained
and the record to the contrary is to be ignored.''46 Under this
interpretation, substantial evidence meant, in effect, such evidence
as, standing alone, would be sufficient to support a finding. As
Justice Frankfurter expressed it, with regard to review of the
42 Orvis v. Higgins, (2d Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 537 at 540. This leads Judge Frank to
declare: "A wag might say that a verdict is entitled to high respect because the jurors are
inexperienced in finding facts, an administrative finding is given high respect because the
administrative officers are specialists (guided by experts) in finding a particular class of
facts, but, paradoxically, a trial judge's finding has far less respect because he is blessed
neither with jurors' inexperience nor administrative officers' expertness." Ibid.
43 United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525 (1948).
44lbid.
45 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001.
46 REPORT OF THE ArroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMITI'EE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 210211 (1941).
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National Labor Relations Board, "It is fair to say that by imperceptible steps regard for the fact-finding function of the Board led
to the assumption that the requirements of the Wagner Act were
met when the reviewing court could find in the record evidence
which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board's findings."47
It was dissatisfaction with this restricted interpretation of the
substantial-evidence rule, as much as anything else, that led to the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. By inserting
an express direction in section 10 (e) of that act to reviewing
courts to consider the "whole record" in determining whether
administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence, the
draftsmen of the 1946 act sought to do away with the pre-APA
judicial tendency just discussed. And in the now-celebrated case
of Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,48
the Supreme Court held that the sponsors of the AP A meant
· just what they said in the "whole record" requirement at the end
of section 10 (e). "Whether or not it was ever permissible," reads
the Court's opinion on this point, "for courts to determine the
substantiality of evidence supporting a Labor Board decision
merely on the basis of evidence which in and of itself justified it,
without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence
from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the new legislation definitively precludes such a theory of review and bars its
practice. The substantiality of evidence must take into account
whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. This is
clearly the significance of the requirement ... that courts consider
the whole record." 49
What, then, does the substantial-evidence rule mean today
under the Administrative Procedure Act? According to one commentator, "underlying the vexed word 'substantial' is the notion
or sense of fairness .... The concept of fairness relates to the attitude of judging. I would say, then, that the judge may-indeed
must-reverse if as he conscientiously sees it the finding is not
fairly supported by the record; or to phrase it more sharply, the
judge must reverse if he cannot conscientiously escape the conclusion that the finding is unfair." 50
47 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 at 478, 71
48 340 U.S. 474, 71
49 Id. at 487-488.
50 Jaffe, "Judicial

S.Ct. 456 (1951).

S.Ct. 456 (1951).

.
Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HARv.
L. REv. 1233 at 1239 (1951).
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When, under this view, is an agency finding unfair? It would
seem, to the present writer, that that is the case when the finding
is not a reasonable one in the light of the evidence in the whole
record. Substantial evidence is hence such evidence as might lead
a reasonable man to make the finding at issue. The evidence in
support of a fact finding is substantial when from it an inference
of the existence of the fact may be drawn reasonably.151 In such
a case, the reviewing court must uphold the finding, even if it
would have drawn a contrary inference from the evidence. "Choice
lies with the Board and its finding is supported by the evidence
and is conclusive where others might reasonably make the same
choice."152
The substantial-evidence rule under the Administrative Procedure Act tests the rationality of administrative findings of fact,
taking into account all the evidence on both sides. The APA
brings us back to the meaning of substantial evidence declared by
Chief Justice Hughes in the Consolidated Edison case-i.e., "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."153 The substantial evidence test is thus
a test of the reasonableness, not of the rightness, of agency findings
of fact.

Law or fact? With this preliminary excursus into the scope of
review completed, we can return to our primary concern, namely,
the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. The analysis of that case showed
us that, under its doctrine, review of the agency finding that petitioners were not "producers," within the meaning of that term
in the relevant statute, was limited to the question of whether
such finding was reasonable. But, we have just seen, the question
of reasonableness is also that which the court must now ask itself
in reviewing administrative findings of fact. Gray v. Powell is so
important to our administrative law precisely because it makes the
scope of review of agency findings like that involved in it similar
to that available over agency findings of fact. In both cases, the
reviewing court can determine only whether the challenged findings possess a rational basis.
151 Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256 at 273, 26 N.E. (2d) 247
(1940).
152 Id. at 274.
ISS Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206 (1938). See
Benjamin, "Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals,'' 48 CoL. L. R.Ev. 1 at 2 (1948).
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Gray v. Powell, it hasjust been said, applies to review of the
finding at issue there the test applicable to review of agency findings of fact. Is the finding that petitioners are not "producers,"
however, one of fact-or even, for that matter, one that is more
factual than legal in nature? The finding involved in Gray v.
Powell was one applying the statutory term "producer" to the
facts of the particular case. Such a finding, involving really the
application of law to fact, has been treated by the Supreme Court
both as one of law and as one of fact. The first approach is illustrated by the well-known case of Federal Trade Commission v.
Gratz.54 It was the first case on the power of the newly created
Federal Trade Commission to restrain "unfair methods of competition" in interstate commerce. The Court there reversed the
conclusion of, the commission that the trade practices involved in
the case constituted such "unfair" methods. The Court did not
confine itself to the question whether reasonable grounds existed
for the administrative conclusion. Instead, it determined upon
its mvn independent judgment the applicability of the statutory
concept. "The words 'unfair methods of competition' are not
defined by the statute, and their exact meaning is in dispute. It
is for the courts, not the Commission, ultimately to determine as
matter of law what they include."55
O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,56 on the other hand, treats the
type of finding under discussion as one of fact. The agency there
had found as a "fact" that a death for which compensation was
sought had arisen "out of and in the course of employment."
The Supreme Court seemed to agree that the question whether
the death so arose was to be treated as a question of fact. "Doing
so" said Justice Frankfurter, "only serves to illustrate once more
the variety of ascertainments covered by the blanket term 'fact.' " 57
Since only a question of fact was involved, the Court held that
review was to be governed by the substantial-evidence rule, as it
was explained in the Universal Camera case.58
Most commentators have followed Justice Jackson and labeled
findings of the type under discussion as "mixed findings of law
and fact.'' 59 Nor can the Court's labeling of such a finding as
54 253

U.S. 421, 40 S.Ct. 572 (1920).

55 Id. at 427.
56 340 U.S. 504,
57 Id.

71 S.Ct. 470 (1951).

at 507.

58 Supra note 48.
59 Dobson v. Commissioner,

320 U.S. 489 at 501, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
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only one of "fact" in the Brown-Pacific-Maxon case obscure the
fact that it actually possesses both legal and factual elements. J ustice Frankfurter himself seems to recognize this when he concedes
that the agency conclusion at issue " ... does not connote a simple,
external, physical event as to which there is conflicting testimony.
The conclusion concerns a combination of happenings and the
inferences drawn from them. In part at least, the inferences presuppose applicable standards for assessing the simple, external
facts." 60 In actuality, the designation by the Court of the finding
as one of "fact" is simply a means of ensuring that its review will
be governed only by the narrow scope of review associated with the
substantial-evidence rule. What was involved in Brown-PacificMaxon was a judicial attempt, of the kind against which an
English judge once protested, "to secure for a finding on a mixed
question of law and fact the unassailability which belongs only to
a finding on questions of pure fact. This is sought to be effected
by styling the finding on a mixed question of law and fact a finding
of fact." 61 It was the convenient styling of the finding at issue as
one of fact by the majority of the Court in Brown-Pacific-Maxon
that led Justice Minton, dissenting there, to declare, "I suppose
the way to avoid what we said today in Universal Camera Corp. v.
Labor Board ... is to find facts where there are no facts, on the
whole record or any piece of it." 62
Although the administrative finding in this type of case may
well be, in large part, one of fact-i.e., whether the death did arise
out of and in the course of decedent's employment depends upon
the factual circumstances under which the death occurred-it also
involves a question of statutory interpretation. To apply the
statutory term "out of and in the course of employment" to the
facts of specific cases is to give concrete meaning to that term.
It is recognized that it will be denied that a finding of the type
under discussion is one of statutory interpretation in the strict
sense. It has been urged that the interpretation and application
of statutes are two different things. In this view, interpretation
properly so called includes only the determination of the proper
sensible meaning of the statute. Application is the process of
determining whether the facts of the particular case are within or
340 U.S. at 507, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951).
Great Western Ry. Co. v. Bater, [1922] 2 A.C. l at 12.
G2 340 U.S. at 510, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951).
60

61
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without that meaning. 63 Under this view, it will be said, findings
of the type we are concerned with involve only the application,
not the interpretation, of the relevant statute.
In the opinion of the present writer, so to differentiate interpretation from application is to make a mere dialectic distinction.
A statutory term can have meaning only in its application to the
particular facts of a particular case. 64 Justice Frankfurter has aptly
pointed out, "Meaning derives vitality from application. Meaning
is easily thwarted or distorted by misapplication." 65 Actually, the
steps in the process of interpreting statutes may be divided into
three parts: (I) finding or choosing the proper statute or statutes
applicable; (2) interpreting the statute law in its technical sense;
and (3) applying the meaning so found to the case at hand. 66
To find out the meaning of a statutory term only in the abstract is to engage in vacuous academic exercise. It is when the
meaning so found is applied to the case at hand that the statute
is really being interpreted. Indeed, as one authority well puts it,
the final application to a specific case is the crux of the whole
process of statutory interpretation. 67
That application really is the critical stage of the interpretive
process is clear upon consideration of Austin's famous distinction
between what he called "genuine" and "spurious" interpretation.
The latter type, said he, involves the application of a statutory
provision to a case which does not upon a proper interpretation
come within the statute. "The judge applies the law to the fact,
according to his opinion of the meaning; or (by a process, which
is generally confounded with interpretation or construction, but
which in truth is legislation) he decides according to his own
notion of what the legislator ought to have established. By this
extensive or restrictive interpretation ex ratione legis~ much judiciary law grows up. " 68
What Austin was declaiming against here was judicial misapplication of statutory terms. Can it be doubted that, in cases of
the kind referred to by him, application of law to fact was not
63 De Sloovere, "Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes," IO N.Y. UNIV. L. Q.
REv. 1 at 17 (1932).
64 NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 at 410, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952).
65 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1945).
66 De Sloovere, "Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes," IO N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. R.Ev.
1 (1932).
61Id. at 20.
68 Id. at 19, quoting 2 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 656, 4th ed. (1873). See Pound, "Spurious
Interpretation," 7 CoL. L. REv. 379 (1907).
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only part of interpretation of the statute, but, in many ways, its
most significant part?
I£ an administrative agency finds that an individual is an employee of some other individual so as to make the regulatory law
administered by it applicable to him, the agency appears clearly to
be interpreting the statutory term "employee." Calling the agency's act mere application and not interpretation cannot change
the fact that its action is giving specific meaning to the legislative
language. And, if questions of statutory interpretation are to be
determined by the reviewing court upon its own independent
judgment, it is difficult to see how they can logically limit their
review over findings claimed to misapply statutory terms. "If
the appellate courts must make an independent examination of
the meaning of every word in . . . legislation, on the assumption
that the construction of legislative language is necessarily for the
appellate courts, how can they reasonably refuse to consider claims
that the words have been misapplied in the circumstances of a
particular case?" 69 It was this approach that led Justice Roberts
to dissent from the decision of the Court in a case applying the
doctrine of Gray v. Powell to review of an agency finding of the
existence of an employment relationship. "The question who is
an employee," said he, "so as to make the statute applicable to
him, is a question of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a
judicial and not an administrative question." 70
That the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is one which, in reality,
applies to review of agency interpretations of their enabling legislation has been admitted (in less guarded moments perhaps) by
members of the highest Court themselves. Under Gray v. Powell,
stated Justice Black recently, "when administrators have interpreted broad statutory terms, such as here involved, we would
recognize that it is our duty to accept this interpretation even
though it was not 'the only reasonable one' or the one 'we would
have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.' " 71
Gray v. Powell assimilates review of questions of statutory interpretation to review of questions of fact. That is a plain statement of its effect, no matter how courts or commentators may try
69 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945), per
Frankfurter, J.
70 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 at 136, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944).
71 Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 at 484, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
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to obscure its meaning. And it is because of its effect that Gray
v. Powell is of such great consequence. It blurs the distinction
between law and fact upon which the scope of review in our administrative law had been grounded. It drastically limits review,
not only of agency findings of "fact" in the narrow, literal sense, 72
but also of agency constructions of statute-law. The latter are
matters which, under the traditional theory of Anglo-American
judicial review, are matters more legal than factual in nature and
hence for the courts upon review. By conveniently labeling them
matters of application, rather than interpretation, our courts have
continued to pay lip-service to the form of the traditional theory.
But the doctrine of Gray v. Powell tends to make the practical
effectiveness of that theory a thing of the past in our administrative
law.

Cases Following Gray v. Powell
The practical effects of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell can best
be seen from an analysis of the Supreme Court decisions following
it. Such analysis will be limited to the post-Gray v. Powell cases
in the highest Court, even though it is recognized that Gray v.
Powell itself was not the first decision applying the doctrine usually associated with its name. Actually, as Professor Davis points
out, although Gray v. Powell is now regarded as the leading case,
"it did no more than to apply what had already been unequivocally established by the Rochester case two years earlier and what
in another form had been developed as early as the second decade
of the century." 73 In the Rochester case74 referred to (whose
chief claim to fame in administrative law rests upon the fact that
in it the Court discarded the so-called "negative order" doctrine
as a restriction upon the availability of review), Justice Frankfurter had actually come close to enunciating the doctrine articulated in Gray v. Powell,7 5 and the same was true, though to a lesser
extent, of the Court's decision in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central
72 SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96 at 126, 69 S.Ct. 1377 (1949).
73 DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 882 (1951).
74 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 59 S.Ct. 754 (1939).
75 In upholding an agency finding that the Rochester company was "controlled

by"
another telephone company, within the meaning of the relevant statute, Justice Frankfurter
said, "So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it
must stand.... 'The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational
basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.'" Id. at 145 and 146.
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R. Co.76 Yet, even if this is conceded, for our purposes, it is not
necessary to deal with the pre-Gray v. Powell decisions. Gray v.
Powell contains the fullest and, perhaps the best, discussion77 of
the doctrine now connected with its name and can, for that reason,
conveniently be considered as the landmark case.
In analyzing the post-Gray v. Powell cases, one is struck by the
fact that most of the decisions of the highest Court do follow the
doctrine of Gray v. Powell when it is relevant. And this impression is strengthened by the fact that most of the apparent aberrational refusals to apply the doctrine, as we shall see in our later
discussion of them, can be explained on rational grounds as not
inconsistent with Gray v. Powell. The fact that it is generally
followed is, indeed, what gives the doctrine of Gray v. Powell its
significance. As a practical matter, it does limit the scope of review
in most cases.
Among the cases applying the Gray v. Powell doctrine, few
have been more important than National Labor Relations Board
v. Hearst Publications.78 That case involved an order by the
NLRB directing respondent to bargain collectively with the newsboys who sold its papers in Los Angeles. Respondent claimed
that the newsboys were not its "employees," but were instead independent contractors. Hence, it was said, the National Labor
Relations Act was inapplicable. The court of appeals agreed
with this view and set aside the Board's order as beyond its statutory authority.79 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
lower court had erred in considering independently the correctness of the agency :finding that the newsboys were employees.
Instead, said the Court, the doctrine of Gray v. Powell should be
applied. It is true that Justice Rutledge started by paying his
formal respects to the rule that, on review, questions of statutory
interpretation are for the courts. "Undoubtedly questions of
statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance
in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is
76 305 U.S. 177, 59 S.Ct. 160 (1938), where the Court applied the rule of limited review
to a finding that a carrier was an "interurban" electric railway within the meaning of the
governing statute.
77 Stem, "Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges, and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis," 58 HARV. L. REV. 70 at 103 (1944).
78 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944).
79 Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, (9th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 608.
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to administer the questioned statute." 80 By going on to apply
Gray v. Powell, however, he made this statement devoid of most
of its practical content. "But where the question is one of specific
application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited.... The Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to be
accepted if it has ~warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis
in law." 81
It has already been emphasized that it is unreal, at least in this
type of case, to dichotomize interpretation and application. The
agency's application of the abstract meaning of the statutory term
to the facts of the particular case was, in truth, the crucial point
in the interpretive process. And yet, with regard to it, following
Gray v. Powell, the Court held that review was to be governed by
the test of reasonableness. It would seem, in fact, that Justice
Rutledge himself recognized that the finding at issue was composed of both legal and factual elements, for he stated the question
for the reviewing court to be whether the finding has warrant in
the record and a reasonable basis in law. "Warrant in the record"
appears to be but another way of stating the substantial-evidence
rule. By his use of the term, the learned justice apparently meant
that the facts found by the agency upon which its ultimate determination of the existence of an employment relationship was
based had to be supported by substantial evidence, for the determination to be upheld. And, in addition, the determination itself
had to have "a reasonable basis in law." This latter requirement
was necessary because the application of the statutory term "employees" to the facts found involved the construction of the relevant act.
This division by Justice Rutledge of the finding at issue in the
Hearst case into its factual and legal elements is one with which,
it is believed, few administrative lawyers would disagree. And
the same is true of his holding that review of the factual elements
is to be governed by what is, more or less, the substantial-evidence
rule. More difficulty is caused, however, by his application of the
test of reasonableness to what is really a question of statutory construction. It is enough, it might be said, if deference to the agency
322 U.S. 111 at 130-131, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944).
Id. at 131. For a decision following the Hearst case, see NLRB v. Atkins &: Co., 331
U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265 (1947).
80

81

1955]

GRAY VS. POWELL AND THE SCOPE OF REVIEW

23

is paid on the facts found by it which underlie its ultimate finding.
But, as far as the question of interpretation involved in such
finding is concerned, the reviewing court should determine
whether it is right, not merely reasonable, as a matter 1of law. Yet
this is exactly what the doctrine of Gray v. Powell, as it was applied in the Hearst case, does not permit the court to do.
Separation of the type just discussed of administrative findings
such as those we are concerned with into their legal and factual
elements (with the former for the courts and only the latter for
the agencies) was expressly denied to be the basis of the law of
review in Dobson v. Commissioner, 82 where the application of the
Gray v. Powell doctrine probably achieved its greatest notoriety.83
The Dobson case dealt with review of a decision of the Tax Court
holding that the recovery by a taxpayer-in respect of a loss (on
a sale of stock) deducted and allowed on returns for an earlier
year, adjustment of the tax liability for which was barred by limitations-was not taxable income where it found that, viewing as
a whole the transactions out of which the recovery arose, the taxpayer had realized no economic gain and had derived no tax benefit from the loss deduction. The court of appeals reversed, stating
that as matter of law the recoveries were neither return of capital
nor capital gain, but were ordinary income in the year received.8 ·1
The Supreme Court, in deciding that the decision of the Tax
Court should be upheld, declared that review of its findings should
be governed by the rules that are applicable in the case of ordinary
administrative agencies, and particularly by the doctrine of Gray
v. Powell. As Justice Jackson put it in his opinion, "all that we
have said of the finality of administrative determination in other
fields is applicable to determinations of the Tax Court. Its decision, of course, must have 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in the law. But 'the judicial function is exhausted when
there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved
by the administrative body.' " 85
In a significant and oft-cited portion of his opinion, Justice
Jackson went on to reject the notion that the reviewing court can,
in this type of case, restrict the rule of limited review to the facts
320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
Nathanson, "Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes," 3
L. REv. 470 at 471 (1950).
84 Harwick v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 732.
85 320 U.S. 489 at 501, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
82
83

VAND.
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upon which the agency determination is based, reviewing the determination itself broadly as involving a construction of the relevant statute. On the contrary, said Justice Jackson, review of the
entire finding must. be governed by the rule of limited review"when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as
to identify a clear-cut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax
Court must stand."86
What was meant by this statement is explained by Justice
Frankfurter in a later opinion. According to him, "Congress did
not authorize review of all legal questions upon which the Tax
Court passed. It merely allowed modification or reversal if the
decision of the Tax Court is 'not in accordance with law.' But
if a statute upon which the Tax Court unmistakably has to pass
allows the Tax Court's application of the law to the situation before it as a reasonable one-if the situation could, without violence
to language, be brought within the terms under which the Tax
Court placed it or be kept out of the terms from which that Court
kept it-the Tax Court cannot in reason be said to have acted 'not
in accordance with law.' In short, there was no 'clear-cut mistake
of law' but a fair administration of it.'' 87
If this is what the Dobson decision stands for, it would seem
that what Justice Jackson meant by the "clear-cut mistake of law"
which could lead to reversal of the Tax Court was simply a finding
that did not have a reasonable basis in law-which is, of course,
merely to restate the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. Once it is admitted that the application of the statuory term or concept by the
Tax Court was an allowable-i.e., reasonable-one, the function of
the reviewing court is exhausted. 88
Dobson v. Commissioner, like the other cases we have been
discussing, illustrates the fact that the doctrine of Gray v. Powell
applies to limit review of findings which involve determination
of questions of law. The Tax Court finding that the particular
transaction did not constitute taxable income clearly was based
upon that tribunal's answer to the legal question of what constituted taxable "income" within the relevant provision of the revenue law. Justice Jackson, it should be noted, expressly denied
this, asserting that "The error of the court below consisted of
treating as a rule of law what we think is only a question of proper
86 Id. at
87 Trust
88 Id. at

502.
of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 381-382, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
382.
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tax·accounting." 89 The assertion by the Court cannot, however,
as Professor Jaffe points out, change the nature of the question
in.volved. "The accountant may treat a stock dividend as income
or not, but the question whether a particular stock dividend is
taxable income does not cease to be a question of law merely because it involves an 'accounting concept.' " 90 The whole point
about the Dobson case is that it makes no difference whether
Justice Jackson or Professor Jaffe is right on the question of proper
classification. "If a question becomes a reviewable question in
tax cases because, abstractly considered, it may be cast into a 'pure
question of law,' it would require no great dialectical skill to throw
most questions which are appealed from the Tax Court into questions of law independently reviewable by the Circuit Court of
Appeals.'' 91 Gray v. Powell, as applied in Dobson, bars the reviewing court from considering anything more than the reasonableness of the finding-regardless of whether or not the finding
is really one which answers a question of law.
The doctrine of Gray v. Powell, in the words of one commentator, led an uneasy existence in tax administration to which the
Dobson case had applied it, until it was finally banished from the
field by congressional action.92 But this has had no effect upon
the doctrine in other branches of administrative law, where it has
continued to be applied in the majority of cases where it is relevant. Among such cases, perhaps the most numerous have been
those involving review of the Interstate Commerce Commissionwhere, it should be noted, the doctrine of limited review of findings of the type we are concerned with actually had its pre-Gray v.
Powell origin.93 Many of the ICC cases have concerned the action
of the commission in granting or denying a certificate of public
convenience and necessity as a common carrier by motor vehicle
under the so-called "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act
89 320

U.S. 489 at 506-507, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
"Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HAR.v.
L. REv. 1233 at 1259 (1951).
1ll Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 382, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
92 Nathanson, "Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes," 3 VAND.
L. REv. 470 (1950). Section 1141 (a) [now §7482] of the Internal Revenue Code was
amended in 1948 so that review of the decisions of the Tax Court now proceeds in the
same manner and to the same extent as review of decisions of the federal district courts
in civil actions tried without a jury. This changes the rule of the Dobson case, insofar as
review of the Tax Court is concerned.
93 See, e.g., the Rochester and Shields cases, cited supra notes 74 and 76, or, for an
earlier case, Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351 at 361, 35 S.Ct. 370 (1915).
90 Jaffe,
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of 1935. It provides for the issuance of a certificate by the commission to a carrier which "was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle on June I, 1935, over the route.~ .
for which application is made and has so operated since that time
... except ... as to interruptions of service over which the applicant had no control," 94 without the need for such carrier to submit
any proof that public convenience and necessity will be served by
its operation or for any further proceedings. In effect, this provision gives those who were in operation as motor carriers at the
time the act was passed a right to the automatic grant of a license
to continue their operations. "An applicant for a grandfather
certificate need not prove public convenience and necessity; he
is entitled to a certificate, as a matter of right, upon proof of substantial bona fide operations on and continuously since the statutory date." 95
The Supreme Court has held, in a number of cases, that review of Interstate Commerce Commission decisions under the
"grandfather clause" is governed by the Gray v. Powell doctrine.
"The function of determining 'grandfather' rights . . .," Justice
Jackson has stated, "is not unlike the function dealt with in Gray
v. Powell . . . in which we said that Congress could have legislated specifically as to individual exemptions but 'found it more
efficient to delegate that function to those whose experience in
a particular field gave promise of a better informed, more equitable adjustment of the conflicting interests. . . .' We held that
this delegation will be respected and that, unless we can say that
a set of circumstances deemed by the Commission to bring a particular applicant within the concept of the statute 'is so unrelated
to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect
to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to
leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed' ... .'' 96 And, acting in accordance with this view; the Court has applied the doctrine of Gray v. Powell to ICC findings in "grandfather clause"
cases that an applicant was in "bona fide" operations as a motor
carrier, 97 that such applicant was under the "control" of a certifi94 49 Stat. L. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §306.
95 Motor Freight Express v. United States, (D.C. Pa. 1954) ll9 F. Supp. 298 at 303.
96 Dissenting, in United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475 at 490, 62 S.Ct.

722 (1942). It should be noted that, despite the implication to the contrary in the dissent,
the majority did not refuse to follow the rule of Gray v. Powell, holding only that the
challenged ICC order was not supported by adequate findings.
97 United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 62 S.Ct. 722 (1942); Alton R.
Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15, 62 S.Ct. 432 (1942).
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cated carrier,98 and that an applicant was not a "contract carrier"
within the meaning of the statute. 99
Indicating how far the doctrine of Gray v. Powell goes in
practice are those decisions upholding ICC "grandfather clause"
findings that interruptions in service were not such as to be beyond
applicants' control. The statute, already quoted, provides that,
for "grandfather" rights to be asserted, the applicant must have
given continuous service as a motor carrier from June 1, 1935 to
the time of the application, except for interruptions over which
the carrier "had no control." In Gregg Cartage Co. v. United
States,10° the Interstate Commerce Commission had held that an
interruption of service caused by the carrier's bankruptcy was not
one over which it had no control within the meaning of the act
and had consequently denied the application. The commission
based its refusal to find that the applicant 'had no control' over
the interruption of service upon the fact that such interruption
followed upon an adjudication of bankruptcy resulting from the
unsuccessful conduct of its business affairs, and did not go back
of the adjudication to find and give detailed consideration to the
particular causes of the failure. The applicant contended that this
was error, and for a rule requiring that in every case of this sort
the commission must trace out the chain of causation and weigh
the bankrupt's judgment against the pressures of circumstance.
The Court upheld the commission, declaring that it was warranted
in holding that the interruption because of bankruptcy was not
one over which the applicant had no control within the meaning
of the Motor Carrier Act. "Whether or not this assumption squares
with philosophical doctrine, or even with reality, is not for our
determination.''101
There was a strong dissent by Justice Douglas, who asserted
that the Interstate Commerce Commission was wrong in construing the statute as not requiring it to go back of the bankruptcy
adjudication to determine whether the cause of the failure was
really within the control of the carrier. The facts of this case,
98 Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 63 S.Ct. 465 (1943), under a statutory
provision denying "grandfather" rights to carriers so controlled.
,09 United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 62 S.Ct. 445 (1942).
100 316 U.S. 74, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942).
101 Id. at 80. Compare McAllister Line v. United States, 327 U.S. 655, 66 S.Ct. 731
(1946), where an ICC finding that interruptions of service because of the depression and
the war were due to circumstances other than those over which the carrier had no control
was upheld.
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said he, show clearly the error of the ICC's construction. Those
facts, as summarized by the dissent, are as follows: During the
year 1936 the applicant was insured against public liability and
property damage by the Central Mutual Insurance Co. Hearing
rumors that Central Mutual was in financial difficulties and was
not paying claims, applicant dropped its policy in December 1936
and placed its insurance with another company. On January 11,
1937, Central Mutual was adjudged a bankrupt and ceased payment of all claims. In the fall of 1937, applicant was forced to
pay several substantial damage claims arising from accidents during the period when its insurance policy was in effect with Central
Mutual. These payments seriously impaired its working capital.
Furthermore, applicant was confronted with approximately 175
additional claims for personal injury and property damage. These
were estimated at about $200,000 and arose during the period
when applicant was insured by Central Mutual. Applicant settled
some of these claims. It was impossible, however, to satisfy the
demands of all of these claimants. Receivership followed and on
its heels came bankruptcy. "There is not the slightest evidence
in this record of any negligence, dereliction, or mismanagement
on the part of applicant. It is undisputed that its failure was
due to the failure of its insurer. And there is no evidence in this
record that it did not exercise due care in the selection of that
insurer. " 102
After analyzing the facts in the case, it is difficult not to agree
with Justice Douglas that the commission was wrong in its construction of the act. But, unless its finding is not only wrong, but
also unreasonable, it must under Gray v. Powell be upheld. Interestingly enough, Justice Douglas, who has usually been a consistent adherent of the Gray v. Powell doctrine,103 implied, in his
dissent, that that doctrine was being pushed too far in this case.
"I would have supposed," said he, "that the question of 'control'
was 'an issue of fact to be determined by the special circumstances
of each case'. . . . That would mean that 'So long as there is
warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must
stand.' . . . But that is quite different from acceding to the suggestion that the non-technical word 'control' may be interpreted
102 316 U.S. 74 at 86,
103 See, e.g., Phillips

62 S.Ct. 932 (1942).
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 at 689, 74 S.Ct. 794
(1954); NLRB v. Highland Park Co., 341 U.S. 322 at 327, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951). And the
same has been true of Black, J., who joined in the dissent. See, e.g., Brannan v. Stark, 342
U.S. 451 at 484, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952).
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in a way which goes against all human experience and which
does violence to its ordinary and accepted meaning." 104 If Justice
Douglas means by this that the agency finding is not only not right
but also not reasonable, then his refusal to uphold the commission
is not inconsistent with Gray v. Powell, for, under it, the reviewing
court can inquire into reasonableness. If, however, he is implying
that the doctrine of limited review is out of place here because
of the nature of the particular finding - i.e., it involves, as he says,
the interpretation of a "non-technical word" - that is quite another thing. It is to this very type of finding that Gray v. Powell
does apply. And the doctrine of that case justifies the majority
of the. Court in upholding the agency as it did here.105
It is not, it is felt, necessary to analyze in detail the other
Supreme Court decisions applying the doctrine of Gray v. Powell
-which range from the celebrated second Chenery case106 to a
number of less noted decisions. 107 Before concluding this portion
of this paper, something should, however, be said of one aspect
of the Gray v. Powell doctrine that is usually not referred to by
courts and commentators. And this is the fact that the Gray v.
Powell type of finding is by its very nature one upon which the
statutory jurisdiction of the particular agency may depend.
In referring to this aspect of the Gray v. Powell doctrine, the
present ·writer has no intention (in this paper, at any rate) of
tilting a lance for the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact," as sponsored
by Crowell v. Benson,10 8 with all the casuistic difficulties spawned
by it.109 At the same time, it cannot be denied that, where an
104 316

U.S. 74 at 85, 88, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942).
It also seems hard to justify Justice Douglas' dissent if, as he says, the finding at
issue is one of "fact," since it clearly seems supported by "substantial evidence" under the
pre-Administrative Procedure Act interpretation of that term.
For other cases applying Gray v. Powell to ICC findings, see McLean Trucking Co. v.
United States, 321 U.S. 67 at 91, 64 S.Ct. 370 (1944); Board of Trade v. United States, 314
U.S. 534, 62 S.Ct. 366 (1942).
106 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947) (finding that reorganization plan was not "fair and equitable").
107 Such decisions, other than those dealt with in other portions of this article, include
Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482, 74 S.Ct. 214 (1953) (finding that petitioner
was engaged in "commerce"); Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct.
801 (1947) (finding that death "arose out of and in the course of employment"); Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct. 245 (1946)
(finding that there was a "labor dispute in active progress"). And see NLRB v. Denver
Building Council, 341 U.S. 675 at 692, 71 S.Ct. 943 (1951); Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 at 321, 64 S.Ct. 95 (1943).
10s 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932).
100 So characterized by Frankfurter, J., concurring, in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S.
114 at 142, 66 S.Ct. 423 (1946).
10:;
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agency misapplies the statute upon which its power rests, it may
well be acting beyond its authority. Proper administration of any
statutory scheme presupposes proper application of the terms and
concepts employed in the relevant legislation. Misapplication of
a key statutory term may well enable the agency to act in excess
of its jurisdiction.110 If an agency like the National Labor Relations ·Board is vested with authority to prohibit unfair labor
practices committed by employers against their employees, its
very power to act is. dependent upon the existence of the employment relationship. To limit review of the Board's application of
the statutory term "employee" is, in effect, to limit review on the
jurisdictional question.11 1 This is what application of the Gray v.
Powell doctrine does in a great many cases.
That this is, in fact, the effect of Gray v. Powell may be seen
from most of the cases just discussed, as well as from Gray v. Powell
itself. In Gray v. Powell, if petitioners were actually "producers"
consuming their own product, they were exempt from the statutory scheme of regulation and the agency concerned had no authority over them. In the Hearst case,112 if the newsboys were
not "employees," the NLRB had no jurisdiction over their employer, and was consequently without power to order him to comply with the Labor Act.11 3 And the same is true in other cases
where Gray v. Powell is applied.11 4 Indeed, it is difficult not to
conclude that the statutory jurisdiction of an administrative
agency is always dependent upon proper application of the terms
and concepts contained in its enabling legislation. Yet, under the
Gray v. Powell doctrine, such application by the agency will be
reviewed no more broadly than the agency's findings of pure fact.
As Justice Murphy has put it, with regard to review of a Federal
Power Commission finding that a company was a "public utility"
and hence subject to its orders under the relevant act, "The Commission . . . has the duty in the first instance of interpreting and
applying these terms to the factual situation confronting it. A
110 Compare DICKINSON, Am,nNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
111 It is not necessary here to discuss the classification of Brandeis,

LAw 307 (1927).
in his famous
dissent in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 85, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932), and decide whether
findings of this type are "jurisdictional" or only "quasi-jurisdictional." The plain fact is
that the agency power to act turns upon such a finding.
112 Supra note 78.
11a And this was true as well in NLRB v. Atkins & Co., mn U.S. 398, 67 S.Ct. 1265
(1947), and Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.CL 789 (1947).
114 See, e.g., Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482, 74 S.Ct. 214 (1953); Cardillo
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947); Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S.Ct. 245 (1946).
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court's function in reviewing this jurisdictional determination is
necessarily limited to ascertaining whether that determination has
warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law, giving due
weight to the fact that the Commission is an expert body designated by Congress and specially equipped to grapple with the
highly technical problems arising in this field." 115
One who is familiar with the dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson116 - the famous case enunciating
the rule that there must be full review of jurisdictional findings
- must agree that there are strong practical arguments in favor
of applying the doctrine of limited review even to findings upon
which agency power to act depends. At the same time, it should
clearly be recognized that the doctrine of Gray v. Powell does have
the effect of restricting review of administrative statutory jurisdiction. And this is inconsistent with the basic theory of ultra vires
upon which the law of judicial review has been grounded in the
Anglo-American world. 117 "An agency may not finally decide the
limits of its statutory power," the Supreme Court has asserted.
"That is a judicial function." 118 Under the doctrine of Gray v.
Powell, however, judicial review of jurisdiction may lose much
of its practical content. "Where the question of jurisdiction depends, as it often does, on [the application of statutory terms]
and where the Federal courts apply their version of the 'substantial
evidence' rule, which often signifies something falling far short
of the weight of the evidence, the ultimate benefits of judicial
review of the question of jurisdiction may be little more than pro
forma. " 119
The dangers inherent in applying the doctrine of Gray v.
Powell to jurisdictional findings can be illustrated by Packard
Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,12° where the Board
115 Dissenting, in Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324
U.S. 515 at 537, 65 S.Ct. 749 (1945). It should be pointed out that the majority decision
in this case was not contrary to Gray v. Powell. The Court held only that the FPC had
misread applicable court decisions [as had happened in the first Chenery case, SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454 (1943)], and that the commission decision was not
clear as to its basis on the jurisdictional issue.
116 285 U.S. 22 at 65, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932).
117 See DICKINSON, ADl',UNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw 307 (1927). In
England, it should be noted, there is still full review of jurisdictional findings. See GRIFFITH
AND STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 208-211 (1952).
118 Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 at 369, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946).
119 Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298 at 303, 70 A. (2d) 77 (1949). The original report
reads "questions of fact," instead of the language herein inserted in brackets, but Chief
Justice Vanderbilt's reasoning applies as well to agency applications of law to fact.
120 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947).
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had decided that the foremen employed by appellant company
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit and had certified their
union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The company
asserted that foremen were not "employees" entitled to the advantages of the Labor Act, and refused to bargain with the union.
The challenged finding of the Board is the same as that involved in the Hearst case121 and is, like it, "jurisdictional," in that
the act under which the Board operates is not applicable in the
absence of the "employer-employee" relationship. Under the Gray
v. Powell doctrine, the scope of review here, like that in Hearst,
should be limited to the question of reasonableness, and this, in
effect, is the theory of review applied by the majority of the Court.
"There is clearly substantial evidence in support of the determination that foremen are an appropriate unit by themselves," said Justice Jackson, "and there is equal evidence that, while the foremen
included in this unit have different degrees of responsibility and
work at different levels of authority, they have such a common relationship to the enterprise and to other levels of workmen that inclusion of all such grades of foremen in a single unit is appropriate.
Hence the order insofar as it depends on facts is beyond our power
of review. . . . Whatever special questions there are in determining the appropriate bargaining unit for foremen are for the
Board, and the history of the issue in the Board shows the difficulty of the problem committed to its discretion. We are not at
liberty to be governed by those policy considerations in deciding
the naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this case,
acting within the terms of the statute."122
Yet, wholly apart from the question of whether such foremen
should be encouraged to organize for collective bargaining, it
would seem that this is the type of case where review limited by
the Gray v. Powell doctrine may be too narrow. The Board, by
its finding on the existence of the "employer-employee" relationship, has extended the benefits of a labor statute to a group of
supervisory employees who are not expressly covered by the act,
and who have in the past normally been identified with the in121 Supra note 78.
122 330 U.S. 485 at

491, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947). According to Professor Jaffe, the Court
in the Packard case considered the application of the statutory term "employee" by the
agency to be a question of law. Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the
Whole Record,' " 64 HARV. L. REv. 1233 at 1258 (1950). It is hard to see how this view
that the Court granted full review is justified, in view of Justice Jackson's express statement that the substantial evidence rule governed. See, in accord with the present writer's
interpretation of Packard, DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 898 (1951).
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terest of management. "Trade union history shows that foremen
were the arms and legs of management in executing labor policies.
In industrial conflicts they were allied with management. Management indeed commonly acted through them in the unfair
labor practices which the Act condemns."123 It is perhaps not
too mud-1 to say that the Board has, in effect, re-written the
governing statute through its interpretation of the statutory definition. "For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers,
assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including the
president; all who are commonly referred to as the management,
with the exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents
applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do
not see how we could deny it and yet allow the present application. "124
This is not to say, of course, that supervisory employees such
as those involved in the Packard case should not be permitted to
bargain collectively. "What I have said does not mean that foremen have no right to organize for collective bargaining."125 But
apart from the merits, one wonders whether the administrative
determination that the protection of the act should extend to
such foremen should be vested with the same degree of finality
as administrative findings of fact. Surely this is the type of case
where the agency interpretation of the statute should be fully
reviewed. Instead, under the doctrine of Gray v. Powell, the extension of the enabling legislation by the administrative body
acting in pursuance of its general policy is placed in a position
of finality,126 although the Board has been "vested merely with
the authority of general words of power."127

Cases Not Following Gray v. Powell
"If the doctrine expounded in such cases as Gray v. Powell,
Hearst, and Chenery were consistently applied, the law would be
susceptible of simple summary. But the doctrine of these cases
1s sometimes applied and sometimes not."128 That is the one
123 330 U.S. 485 at 496 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
124 Id. at 494.
125 Id. at 500.
126 Subject, of course, to the rational-basis test of Gray v. Powell.
127 Lord Shaw, dissenting, in Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260 at 300.
128 DAVIS, ADMINISl'RATIVE LAW 887 (1951).
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great difficulty with the doctrine of Gray v. Powell for administrative lawyers in this country. Even if one completely disagrees with
the doctrine itself, he would still wish it to be applied consistently.
If the Supreme Court, instead of adhering firmly to the doctrine
which is, of course, the product of its own handiwork, incongruously refuses to follow it in cases where it seems relevant, it
makes the task of the legal profession an unduly hard one. This
is especially true when the Court not only does not overrule the
doctrine but follows it, as we have seen, in the majority of cases.
It has already been mentioned that perhaps the primary concern of the present writer, in undertaking the reexamination in
this paper of Gray v. Powell, has been to attempt to explain the
Supreme Court decisions that have not applied its doctrine. It
cannot be denied that there has been an all too distressingly large
number of such decisions. Are they mere judicial aberrations,
attributable only to the vagaries of the justices of the highest
tribunal, or can they be explained upon a rational basis?
It is difficult to answer this question because the Supreme
Court itself has never seen fit to tell us the circumstances under
which it would refuse to follow the doctrine of Gray v. Powell.
In many of these cases, indeed, when the doctrine was seemingly
not adhered to, the Court did not attempt to tell us at all why it
was discarding the rule of limited review or, for that matter, even
to mention Gray v. Powell or the doctrine in its opinion. The fact
that the Court has not explained why it was acting as it did in
these cases has not, however, prevented students of its jurisprudence from trying to determine the factors upon which the application or non-application of the Gray v. Powell doctrine in specific
cases might depend.
Perhaps the best-known attempt of this type was that made
by John Dickinson. According to him, "Where the only ground
which a court can give for its difference from the administrative
body is limited to mere difference of opinion as to some matter
or matters peculiar to the case, or some difference in inference
from those matters, then the court should not- disturb the opinion
or inference of the fact-finding body unless the latter is plainly
beyond the bounds of reason; for the difference is one of discretion,
or 'fact.' On the other hand, where the ground of difference between court and fact-finding body can be isolated and expressed
as a general proposition applicable beyond the particular case to
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all similar cases, the court, if it holds the proposition one of
sound law, must enforce it by overruling the administrative determination. " 129
Although this passage was actually written some fifteen years
before Gray v. Powell, it has been referred to with approval by
both courts and writers since that case was decided. A typical
example is the statement by Chief Justice Stone in an important
case involving the application of Dobson v. Commissioner.
"Ordinarily," said he, "questions of reasonableness and proximity
are for the trier of fact, here the Tax Court. . . . And even when
they are hybrid questi<;ms of 'mixed law and fact,' their resolution,
because of the fact element involved, will usually afford little
concrete guidance for future cases, and reviewing courts will set
aside the decisions of the Tax Court only when they announce a
rule of general applicability, that the facts found fall short of meeting statutory requirements." 130 This appears to be but a restatement of the Dickinson test.
With all respect to the eminent authority just cited, analysis
of the Dickinson test indicates that it does not actually explain
when the Court will and when it will not follow the Gray v.
Powell doctrine.131 Some of the cases already referred to indicate
this. In the Gregg Cartage Co. case,132 for example, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, in finding as it did, was really laying
down a general rule that every bankruptcy arose from conditions
which were within the "control" of the bankrupt within the
meaning of the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act.
And, in the second Chenery case,133 as Professor Davis points
out,134 the Securities and Exchange Commission, in finding that
the reorganization plan was not "fair and equitable" under the
relevant statutory provision, had clearly announced what the
Court called "a new principle,'' which would be applied in other
reorganization cases. Yet, in both of these cases, where the agency
168 (1927).
of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 370, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945). For
approvals by writers of the Dickinson test, see Stem, "Review of Findings of Administrators,
Judges, and Juries: A Comparative Analysis," 58 HARV. L. REv. 70 at 105 (1944); Paul,
"Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REv. 753 at
830 (1944); Brown, "Fact and Law in Judicial Review," 56 HARV. L. REv. 899 at 904 (1943).
131 In all fairness to Dickinson, it must, of course, be conceded that he never intended
it to furnish such explanation, as his book was written long before the doctrine of limited
review in the type of case we are concerned with had crystallized in Gray v. Powell.
132 316 U.S. 74, 62 S.Ct. 932 (1942).
133 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947).
134 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 904 (1951).
129 DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW
130 Trust
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findings established general propositions, the Court applied the
Gray v. Powell doctrine. Conversely, in a number of the cases
to be discussed in this portion of this paper, where the Court
appeared not to follow Gray v. Powell, the agency finding seemed
to involve only the application of the statutory term to the unique
facts of the case, and did not expressly establish any general proposition applicable beyond the particular case.135
In addition, it must be admitted that the present writer is
not clear in his own mind just what the Dickinson test means.
The difficulty arises from the fact that every agency finding involving the application of a statutory term to the facts of a particular case establishes "a general proposition applicable . . . to all
similar cases." "A precedent can always be used as an analogy
for future cases, even when the facts seem to be unique."136
Taken literally, then, the Dickinson test appears to be based
upon a distinction which normally does not exist in practice. The
agency finding may be based only upon the particular facts; even
so, it may well serve as the basis for decision in other similar
cases. As Justice Frankfurter expressed it, in a Tax Court case
when the Dobson rule was still in effect,137 "It is possible to transform every so-called question of fact concerning the propriety of
expenses incurred by trustees into a generalized inquiry as to what
the duties of a trustee are and, therefore, whether a particular activity satisfied the conception of management which trusteeship devolves upon a trustee. Such a way of dealing with these problems inevitably leads to casuistries which are to be avoided by a
fair distribution of function between the Tax Court and the reviewing courts."138 He went on to reject the Dickinson test as
the basis for applying the Dobson rule. "But even assuming that
the 'issues are broader than the particular facts presented' by this
case, the Tax Court's decision is not deprived of finality. Yet an
assumption to the contrary is at the core of the Government's
argument. Simply because the correctness of 'certain general
propositions' is involved does not make the position taken by the
Tax Court a question of law."139
135 See, e.g., Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954); Thompson v.
United States, 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952); Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342
U.S. 197, 72 S. Ct. 233 (1952); Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944);
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944).
136 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 904 (1951).
137 See no.te 92 supra.
138 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 383, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
139 Ibid.
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In the case just referred to, Justice Frankfurter was not content merely to reject the Dickinson test of general propositions
versus the application of legal concepts to unique facts. 140 He
also informed us what, in his opinion, the true test was. "The
real question is: What is the nature of the issue upon which the
Tax Court has pronounced? If the issue presents a difficulty
which it is peculiarly within the competence of the Tax Court
to resolve and that court has given a fair answer, every consideration which led to the pronouncement in the Dobson case should
preclude independent reexamination of the Tax Court's disposition.''141
Justice Frankfurter's test appears to be basically similar to
that urged by Professor Davis. According to Professor Davis, the
governing criteria are the comparative qualification of agencies
and courts. "The one element that stands out above all others
is the comparative qualification of the agency and of the court
to decide the particular question. Variation in intensiveness of
review in accordance with comparative qualifications is so natural
as to be almost inevitable whatever the theoretical formula." 142
At first glance, the test of comparative qualifications seems an
attractive one. The basic theory of review of administrative action in the Anglo-American world has, indeed, as has been mentioned,143 been grounded upon that test, for the law-fact distinction rests upon a division of labor between judge and administrator, with each being given authority to decide the questions
deemed to be within his competence. But, although the test of
comparative qualifications may thus be the ultimate basis of our
law of judicial review, one wonders whether it alone furnishes
a workable criterion for the application of the Gray v. Powell
doctrine.
Using the comparative qualifications test in the cases where
the Gray v. Powell doctrine is relevant does not, it is felt, satisfactorily explain many of the decisions. It is true that, in a case
like Dobson v. Commissioner,14 4 where the Court said that the
challenged finding turned upon a question of proper tax accounting, it could validly be said that such a question was peculiarly
140 The test is so phrased in DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
141325 U.S. 365 at 384, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
142 DAVIS, ADl',UNISTRATIVE LAW 893 (1951).
143 P. 10 supra.
144 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943).
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within the special competence of the Tax Court.145 The same
is true in some of the other cases discussed in this paper.146 Many
of the decisions cannot, however, be explained by the comparative
qualifications test. Most of the cases, as Professor Davis concedes,
"involve questions on which the reviewing judges may easily educate themselves. Judges as well as administrators are competent
to handle problems about unfair labor practices, unfair trade
practices, discriminatory activities of public utilities, deception
in the marketing of securities, unreasonableness of rates, the
publc interest with respect to broadcasting, application of the tax
laws~ and the like."147 And, despite the author's conclusions to
the contrary,148 it would seem, to the present ·writer at least, that
the test of comparative qualifications is not workable in cases involving these subjects.
That this is true can be seen from a comparison of some of
the cases. In the already discussed Gregg Cartage Co. case,149 the
Court applied the Gray v. Powell doctrine to limit review of a
finding that an interruption of a motor carrier's service because
of bankruptcy was not one over which the carrier had no "control."
Yet it would seem that the question of whether the bankruptcy
was within the carrier's control (especially since the agency was
relying on a general rule that every bankruptcy arose from causes
within the bankrupt's control within the meaning of the Motor
Carrier Act) is one on which the courts are at least as competent
as the agency.
In the Hearst case,1 50 as we saw, the Court applied Gray v.
Powell to review of an agency finding that certain newsboys were
"employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations
Act. On the other hand, in a case to be discussed, the Court
appears to have reviewed fully an administrative finding that a
company was an "employer" under the relevant section of the
Railroad Retirement Act.151 Why was the agency the better quali145 The language used by Frankfurter, J., in Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325
U.S. 365 at 380, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
146 This is particularly true of Interstate Commerce Commission findings, such as
those involved in cases like Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952);
United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 62 S.Ct. 445 (1942); Alton R. Co. v.
United States, 315 U.S. 15, 62 S.Ct. 432 (1942).
147 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 894 (1951).
148Ibid.
.
149 Supra note 100.
150 Supra note 78.
151 Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co., 326 U.S. 446, 66 S.Ct. 238
(1946).
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fied to find the existence of the employment relationship in the
first case and the Court the better qualified in the second? The
answer is, of course, that the test of comparative qualifications
does not explain the difference in the Court's approach in the two
cases.152
Even if the comparative qualifications idea were to work more
satisfactorily, it would still have to be rejected. The whole point
about judicial review is that, through it, the decisions of the administrative expert are subjected to the impartial scrutiny of the
non-expert judge. In the Anglo-American system, the courts are
presumed to be competent in matters involving statutory construction, regardless of whether the administrator may, in fact,
be more qualified in the particular case. Only if such matters
are decided judicially, it is felt, can it be made certain that the
agencies do not pass the bounds of their statutory powers.
What has been said above indicates that the tests suggested
by some commentators are not adequate to explain the cases which
do not follow the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. Must we then conclude that the application of that doctrine in particular cases depends upon the individual caprices of the judges who make up
the reviewing court? That there is a certain amount of judicial
discretion involved in the application of the Gray v. Powell doctrine cannot be denied. At the same time, there are certain criteria which appear to have influenced the highest Court in deciding
not to apply the doctrine in specific cases. What these are can best
be gathered from an analysis of those cases themselves. Such
analysis will seek to determine why, in each of these cases, the
Court did not choose to follow the Gray v. Powell doctrine. Most
of the Court's refusals can, it will be seen, be explained on rational
grounds, not inconsistent with the doatrine. This is true even
though the Court itself did not, in many of these cases, expressly
state the reasons to be urged by the present writer.

Adversary procedure in contested cases. If the doctrine of Gray
v. Powell is a sound one, it rests upon the same theory as does
limited review of administrative findings of fact. The agency,
which has made such findings, is presumably more expert than
the reviewing court in the field administered by it, if only be152 See also Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954); Thompson v.
United States, 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S.
441, 67 S.Ct. 411 (1947); Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944), where
the test of comparative qualifications cannot explain why the Court granted full review.
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cause of its constant preoccupation with cases in that field. In
addition, there is the need for preserving the integrity of the
administrative process. It may be extreme to say, as did a Wisconsin judge, that "If courts are to weigh the evidence before
commissions . . ., the efficiency of administrative action will be
greatly impaired. If it must give a trial de novo, the twilight of
administrative law is at hand, for the proceedings before the administrative body will be but a perfunctory skirmish, the principal
contribution of which will be delay."153 But there are few administrative lawyers in this country who would deny that for the
courts on review to, in effect, repeat the entire decision process
of the agencies would be to turn their proceedings into mere
preliminaries to the real contests which would occur in the courts.
This would frustrate the legislative purpose in vesting powers of
decisions in agencies, rather than courts, in the first instance.
Instead of withdrawing from litigation the great bulk of cases
coming within administrative competence, it would make possible
a procedure whereby such cases must be fully litigated twice before they could be finally resolved.154
Gray v. Powell applies these considerations, which, from almost
the beginning of our administrative law, were seen to militate
against wide review of facts, to agency applications of law to fact,
even though they may involve the construction by the agency of
its enabling legislation. Both the rule of limited review of fact
findings and the doctrine of Gray v. Powell are, however, based
upon the fact that the findings at issue have been fully considered
by the agency in an actual contested case. They have been arrived
at after a formal adversary procedure in which all interested
parties have been able fully to present their side of the case, both
through evidence and argument and through the right to attack
their opponent's case, by cross-examination and rebuttal evidence.
The findings challenged on review, in cases governed both by the
substantial-evidence rule and Gray v. Powell, have been made
by the agency concerned after it has considered the case presented
by both sides, as it has been developed at the hearing, and, indeed
under the fundamental principle of "exclusiveness of the record,"
only materials in the record of the hearing can be considered by the
153 General Accident F. &: L. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 223 Wis. 635 at
646, 271 N.W. 385 (1937).
154 Compare Brandeis, J., dissenting, in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 74, 52 S.Ct.
285 (1932).
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agency in its decision process.11rn That the agency has made its
findings after a formal adversary proceeding, in which all those
affected could fully present their case, and after full consideration
of the record, is bound to be of great influence in inducing the
reviewing court to defer to those findings, even though they may
involve questions of statutory interpretation.
The same considerations do not apply where Gray v. Powell
type findings have not been made in an actual contested case.
Even though Gray v. Powell may require judicial deference to
agency interpretations made in decisions rendered inter partes,
it does not necessarily follow that the same deference must be
paid to other administrative interpretations. On the contrary,
interpretations by agencies of statutes enforced by them which are
not made in adversary proceedings after full hearing should not
come within the Gray v. Powell doctrine. There is, as Judge
Learned Hand has pointed out, "indeed a basis for making such
a distinction because the position of a public officer, charged with
the enforcement of a law, is different from one who must decide
a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the case
for the side which he represents, and leave decision to the court,
or the administrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility
of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will, at
least it may, be surrendered forever; and yet it may be right.
Since such rulings need not have the detachment of a judicial,
or semi-judicial decision, and may properly carry a bias, it would
seem that they should not be as authoritative. . . ." 156
The Supreme Court itself appears to have made the distinction
referred to by Judge Hand the basis-for its decision in Fishgold v.
Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp.151 That case involved the
construction of that portion of the Selective Service Act1158 which
provided that one who has been inducted into military service is
entitled, upon returning to civilian life, to be reemployed in his
old position or in "a position of like seniority, status, and pay." A
former employee who has thus been reemployed "shall not be
discharged from such position without cause within one year after
such restoration." Plaintiff, a veteran, was reemployed. When
1155 See

§7 (d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 237, 5
(1952) §1001.
1156 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 785 at
789-790.
1157 328 U.S. 275, 66 S.Ct. Il05 (1946).
158 54 Stat. L. 885, §8 (1940), now 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §459 (b) (A) (1).

u.s.c.
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subsequent layoffs occurred because of slack work, he was laid off
for various brief periods of time, while other employees, nonveterans, were retained. The non-veterans were senior employees;
that is, their length of service· with the employer was greater than
plaintiff's even though his time in military service had been
counted as service in the plant. The collective bargaining agreement then in force provided that "decreases in the working force
shall be based on length of service" and the employer acted under
this contract in retaining older employees when plaintiff was laid
off. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that, under the
statute, he could not be laid off within a year after his restoration,
so long as work was available for any employee. He relied on a
memorandum issued by the Director of Selective Service pursuant
to his authority to establish a "Personnel Division" to render aid to
veterans "in the replacement in their former positions." The Director's memorandum stated that the act required reinstatement of a
veteran to "his former position or one of like seniority, status and
pay even though such reinstatement necessitates the discharge of
a non-veteran with greater seniority." The Supreme Court, agreeing with the decision of Judge Hand already quoted from, rejected
the administrative interpretation relied upon by plaintiff. "The
ruling of the Director," said Justice Douglas, "may be resorted
to for guidance. . . . But his rulings are not made in adversary
proceedings and are not entitled to the weight which is accorded
interpretations by administrative agencies entrusted with the responsibility of making inter partes decisions. " 159
Several of the cases where the Supreme Court has not followed
the doctrine of Gray v. Powell can be explained by the absence in
them of an actual contested case before the agency. The most recent of them is Federal Communications Commission v. American
Broadcasting Co.~ 160 which may, at first glance, appear to involve
another capricious refusal of the highest Court to apply the Gray
v. Powell doctrine. At issue was the validity of an FCC order
adopting certain interpretative rules in relation to radio and
television "give-away" programs. The Court, in a unanimous
decision, held that "give-away" programs were not within the
criminal statute161 prohibiting the broadcasting of any lottery
159 328 U.S. 275 at 290, 66 S.Ct. 1105 (1946). This does not mean that the reviewing
court will not give weight to such agency interpretations. See Skidmore v. Swift and Co.,
323 U.S. 134 at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161 (1944).
160 347 U.S. 284, 74 S.Ct. 593 (1954).
16118 u.s.c. (1952) §1304.
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gift enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes dependent upon
lot or chance and that the commission rules attempting to prohibit
such programs by licensing were invalid. The FCC's authority
to enforce the criminal prohibition, by the exercise of its licensing
power, is limited by the scope of the statute. Since the programs
in question are not illegal under the statute, the commission cannot employ the statute to make them so by agency action.
At issue in the instant case was the application of the statutory term "lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme" to the undisputed facts. Under Gray v. Powell, the administrative application must be upheld if it is reasonable. At the same time,
there is no doubt that the Court in this case was reviewing not
the reasonableness, but the rightness, of the FCC action. Why
was not the Gray v. Powell doctrine applied to limit the scope of
review here?
The answer is, at least in part, based upon the distinction
drawn above between agency interpretations made in contested
cases after full hearing and those made in other ways. The FCC
application of the statutory term "lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme" to "give-away" programs was not made in an
actual case decided by the agency. It was contained, instead, in
an order of the commission adopting certain interpretative rules
in relation, to such programs. Like the rules at issue in the celebrated Columbia Broadcasting System case,1 62 whether these rules
would actually be applied in a specific case depended upon the
contingency of future administrative action. Nor did it make any
difference, in the instant case, that the proposed rules had actually
been considered at a hearing of the full commission. This did not
change the nature of the proceeding from rule-making to adversary
adjudication. "It was not necessary for the Commission to take
testimony before adopting the Rules .... The Commission was not
adjudicating any controversy which would require a hearing and
the application of trial procedure. That might come later, in a
specific case, when an application for a renewal license would be
under consideration. " 163
The fact that general rule-making was involved in the A merican Broadcasting Co. case would appear to explain why the Court
there did not limit review by the Gray v. Powell doctrine, for it
162 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194 (1942).
163 American Broadcasting Co. v. United

at 383.

States, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 374
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applies only to agency resolutions of specific contested cases. Yet,
even though the agency action may dispose of an actual case, the
considerations which make for the application of Gray v. Powell
may not be present. That case requires judicial deference to the
type of finding involved in it because the agency, vested with competence by the legislature in the particular case, has made the
finding after full consideration of all of tlJ_e evidence presented at
a formal adversary hearing. If the agency decision, though it
resolves a contested case, is one which has not been preceded by a
full hearing, the doctrine of Gray v. Powell need not be applied.
What has just been said helps to explain a Supreme Court
decision, which has given difficulty to commentators seeking to
explain the Gray v. Powell doctrine. In the case referred to Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles164-petitioner conducted a public
warehouse in Los Angeles. As a public utility under the applicable California laws, it was subject to regulation by the relevant California agency. The Federal Price Administrator, acting under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,165 issued
maximum price regulations whose effect would have been to
prohibit petitioner from charging an increased rate authorized
by the California regulatory agency. The Price Control Act provided that "nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize
the regulation of . . . (2) rates charged by any common carrier or
other public utility." Petitioner, asserting itself to be within
this exemption, made timely protest to the price administrator,
which was denied. It then filed a complaint with the Emergency
Court of Appeals, asking it to set aside the maximum price regulations in so far as they purported to regulate its charges. The
Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint.166 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that petitioner was a "public
utility" within the exemption clause of the federal law.
There is little doubt but that the Court in the Davies case substituted its judgment for that of the agency in the manner which
the Gray v. Powell doctrine sought to preclude. Indeed, Justice
Jackson expressly rejected as inapplicable in the case the doctrine
that "we should accept the Administrator's view in deference to
administrative construction."167 It is not, however, necessary to
164 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944).
165 56 Stat. L. 23, c. 26, §302 (c) (1942).
166 Davies Warehouse Co. v. Brown, (Em.
167 321 U.S. 144 at 156, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944).

Ct. App. 1943) 137 F. (2d) 201.
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conclude from this that the Davies case is inconsistent with Gray
v. Powell.168 Although the two cases were substantially similar1 69
there was at least one basic difference. In Gray v. Powell, the
challenged finding had been made after a formal adversary hearing before the agency. In Davies, this essential element was lacking. The price administrator had, it is true, decided petitioner's
specific case. But he had not done so after a full and fair hearing.
Although the protest procedure of the Office of Price Administration did afford affected individuals some opportunity to present
their views, it clearly did not provide for a full, judicial-type adversary hearing "in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play."170 And, in such
a case, as already pointed out, there is reason for not vesting the
agency interpretive finding with the Gray v. Powell degree of
finality. 171

Conflicting interpretations. The doctrine of Gray v. Powell
applies the rule of limited review to administrative interpretations
of statutory terms, provided, as we have just seen, that such interpretations are made in actual contested cases after full hearings.
In such cases, it is felt by our courts, they must defer to the
agencies charged with the job of continuous administration in the
areas assigned to them by the legislature. Gray v. Powell rests
essentially upon the expertise of administrative agencies, which is
said to render them peculiarly competent in their specialized fields,
even when it comes to giving specific content to the terms of legislation covering those fields. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, the
specialized equipment of the agencies and the trained instinct that
comes from their experience ought to leave with them the final say
as to matters which involve construction and application of legislation.172
168 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
169 Id. at 887.

LAw 887-888 (1951), so concludes.

170 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 at 22, 58 S.Ct. 773 (1938). That the procedure
under the Emergency Price Control Act provided for less than a full adversary hearing is
well shown by Roberts, J., dissenting, in,Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 at 453-454,
64 S.Ct. 660 (1944).
171 Other cases where full review was granted because of the lack of formal adversary
hearings are Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 67 S.Ct. 1547 (1947); United States v.
Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463 (1947). Compare Frankfurter, J., dissenting, in SEC v.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 at 301, 66 S.Ct. IIOO (1946) (rule of limited review not applicable
where action brought by agency for injunction).
172 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 at 380-381, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945).
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It would seem, however, that for judicial deference to be required on review of the Gray v. Powell type of finding, the challenged administrative interpretation should be consistent with
that rendered in other cases ·by the agency. If, on the contrary,
the agency construction at issue is inconsistent with that taken on
other occasions, there is much less reason for the Gray v. Powell
doctrine to apply. Where the administrative expert himself is
so unsure of his ground that he has taken different positions in
different cases, the courts may be forgiven if, on review, they feel
something less than the confidence in agency expertise that called
forth the rule of limited review in Gray v. Powell itself. In such
a case, the reviewing court may well declare that the agency decisions themselves hardly have the consistency to which it should
yield its judgment. 173 This view was well expressed by Justice
Rutledge in a case where the agency1 74 had rendered inconsistent
decisions applying the relevant statutory term in two cases before
it. "One might," he conceded, "entertain the view that in a close
situation the [agency's] judgment should be accepted whatever way
the die were cast, although reviewing courts might differ on the
direction. But it would not follow, and in my judgment should
not, that they are powerless when the throw is in opposite directions at the same time. When this occurs, in my opinion a 'clearcut' question of law is presented, rising above the rubric of 'expert
administrative determination.' The more apt characterization
would be 'expert administrative fog.' " 175
A number of Supreme Court decisions which appear inconsistent with the doctrine of Gray v. Powell can be explained by
the fact that there were conflicting administrative interpretations
present in those cases. An illustrative case is Barrett Line v. United States,11 6 which arose out of the Interstate Commerce Commission's refusal to grant an applicatiqn for "grandfather" rights to
engage in the business of a contract carrier by water, under a
statutory provision basically similar to that applicable to motor
carriers which has already been considered.177 Review of ICC
173 Hand, J., in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock. and Repair Corp., (2d Cir. 1946) 154 F.
(2d) 785 at 789.
174 The case involved review of the Tax Court which was, at that time, under the
rule of Dobson v. Commissioner, supra note 82, treated like an administrative agency so
far as the scope of review of its decisions was concemed.
175 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 at 533, 66 S.Ct. 299 (1946).
176 326 U.S. 179, 65 S.Ct. 1504 (1945).
177 Supra note 94.
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decisions under the "grandfather clause" of the Motor Carrier Act
is, we have seen, governed by the doctrine of Gray v. Powell.
Despite this, the Court, in the Barrett Line case, held that the
commission had erred in concluding that the applicant was not
engaged in chartering operations subject to the act on the critical
date. The Court seems to have reviewed the rightness, rather
than merely the reasonableness, of the commission's decision
that the applicant was not a bona fide carrier engaged in chartering operations. And this led four dissenting justices, citing Gray
v. Powell, to assert, "We think that the interpretation ... made
by the Commission was proper. Certainly, the construction of
this provision involves considerations so bound up with the technical subject matter that, even though the neutral language of
the statute permits, as a matter of English, the construction which
the Court now makes, the experience of the Commission should
prevail."178
The apparent arbitrary refusal of the majority of the Court to
follow Gray v. Powell is explained by the fact that the ICC itself
had, in a number of other cases involving similar facts, reached a
different result, holding in them that the applicants were engaged
in bona fide operation as carriers within the meaning of the act.
What the Court terms this agency "inconsistency in the statute's
application"179 was, without a doubt, the factor that induced the
Court to decline to follow the Gray v. Powell approach. This is
recognized by the dissenting justices, who state that, "The Court,
in rejecting the refusal of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to grant a permit as a contract carrier by water for charter purposes, is greatly influenced by an alleged conflict in the Commission's determinations."180 The dissenters go on to declare that
the inconsistencies in agency interpretation should make no difference. "Assuming such a conflict, it is our business to deal with
the case now here and not to be concerned with apparent inconsistencies in administrative determinations."181 It has already
been shown, however, that the presence of conflicting interpretations is of great importance in determining whether the Gray v.
Powell doctrine should be followed. Where the administrative
178 326 U.S. 179 at 202, 65 S.Ct. 1504 (1945).
179 Id. at 197.
180 Id. at 201.
181 Id. at 201-202.
182 Compare United States v. American Union

Transport, 327 U.S. 437 at 454, 66 S.Ct.
644 (1946) (agency failure to exercise jurisdiction held not like conflicting interpretations
so as to make Gray v. Powell inapplicable).
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expert himself is not certain that the interpretation urged by him
in the particular case is sound, there is no real reason why the reviewing court should defer to his judgment.182
In the Barrett Line case just discussed, the conflicting applications of the statute were made by the same agency. What happens
if the inconsistent interpretations are made by different agencies?
In such a case, too, it is believed the doctrine of Gray v. Powell
should not apply. If the interpretation of the administrative expert whose act is being reviewed is contradicted by that of other
administrators, the reviewing court should decide the question for
itself, rather than show the Gray v. Powell type of deference to
any of the conflicting experts. For, if this is not done, to which of
the experts should the court defer? To the agency whose act is
being reviewed, simply because it happens to be involved in the
particular case? If that is the rule, what is the court to do if, at a
later date, the inconsistent interpretation of the other agency is
challenged before it? Such interpretation will also have to be upheld if it is reasonable and that may well mean the giving of
judicial sanction to two diametrically opposed agency interpretations.
That this is not a mere theoretical possibility is shown by
Barnard v. Carey,183 a case whose facts were so extreme as almost to
defy belief, except that they were so reported by the district court.
The plaintiffs in the Barnard case were the manufacturer of and
·a dealer in "Soya Butter," a product made exclusively from soya
beans and other vegetable products. Under the relevant section
of the Internal Revenue Code,1 84 the Collector of Internal Revenue could order oleomargarine manufactured for sale to be labeled
and taxed as such. His orders with respect to labeling could be
enforced by distraint proceedings as well as by criminal penalties.
At the same time, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,185
the Food and Drug Administration was given authority to see that
food products were labeled properly. And improp.er labeling
under that law, too, could be punished by distraint and criminal
penalties.
In the district court, plaintiffs offered in evidence a photostatic
copy of a letter dated November 13, 1942, addressed to the plaintiff Butler Food Products, attention H. 0. Butler, and signed by
183 (D.C. Ohio 1945) 60 F. Supp. 539.
184 I.R.C. §2300 et seq., now I.R.C. (1954), §§4591-4597.
185 52 Stat. L. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. (1952)

§§301-392.
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D. S. Bliss, Deputy Commissioner, stating that according to the
analysis of the Treasury Department the product was found to be
oleomargarine and that it would be necessary therefore for the
manufacturer to label his product as such. Plaintiffs also offered
in evidence a photostatic copy of a letter dated October 31, 1942,
addressed to H. 0. Butler, Director Butler Food Products, and
signed by C. W. Crawford, Assistant Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, stating: "It is our understanding that you are familiar with
the standard for oleomargarine promulgated under the terms of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The product you
describe is not in conformity with that standard and can not be
sold as oleomargarine within the jurisdiction of that Act."
The plaintiffs were thus subject to diametrically opposed orders
by two federal agencies, each of which had jurisdiction under the
relevant laws. The Bureau of Internal Revenue had ordered them
to label their product as oleomargarine. The Food and Drug Administration had ordered them not to label their product as
oleomargarine. And, if either order was disobeyed, the plaintiffs were subject to the penalties prescribed in the act. In order
to extricate themselves from their predicament, plaintiffs brought
an action against the Collector of Internal Revenue for a declaration that their product was not oleomargarine and should not be
taxed as such.
For the reviewing court to apply the Gray v. Powell doctrine
to limit its review of the order challenged before it in a case like
this, in the face of the conflicting interpretation of the Food and
Drug Administration, would be, to put it mildly, unjust to plaintiffs. Under Gray v. Powell, the Treasury's application of the
statutory term "oleomargarine" to the facts of the case would have
to be upheld, unless it was unreasonable. But the same would
also be true of the ruling of the Food and Drug Administration in
a later action testing its validity. As the opinion of the court in
the Barnard case put it, "When the court inquired whether all the
arguments advanced for the Collector could not also be advanced
in support of the order of the Commissioner of Foods and Drugs,
it was admitted that they could be. The court therefore found
· itself in the position where, if it adopted those theories, it would
today be obligated to sustain the order of the Collector distraining
the plaintiff's product because not labeled 'oleomargarine', and
then tomorrow might be obligated to sustain the order of the Com-
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missioner of Food and Drugs distraining the product because it
was labeled 'oleomargarine.' " 186
In a case like Barnard v. Carey, the Gray v. Powell doctrine
would lead to ridiculous results. Under it, the action of both
agencies would have to be upheld, for each, if it stood alone, involved a reasonable interpretation of the law. But, said Judge
Wilkin, in granting a motion for a temporary injunction against
the enforcement of the Treasury order, a court exercising general
equitable jurisdiction must be able to give plaintiffs some remedy.
The implication is that where the agencies themselves conflict in
their interpretations, there is no room for the doctrine of limited
review. And, while this may be contrary to Gray v. Powell, it is
certainly in accord with common sense.

Barnard v. Carey is the extreme case. Yet it shows that the
rule of limited review is wholly out of place in cases where challenged administrative applications of statutes are inconsistent with
those made by other agencies. In such cases, there is no reason
why the reviewing court should defer to the expertise of any one
agency. It should consequently decline to follow Gray v. Powell.
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp.,1 81 which has
been discussed in another connection, appears to bear out this
view. We have already seen that the Court there refused to follow
Gray v. Powell because the agency interpretation had not been
made in a contested adversary proceeding. Also of weight, however, in inducing the Court to decide as it did was the fact that the
interpretation of the Director of Selective Service, upon which
plaintiff had relied, was inconsistent with the construction given
to the relevant statutory term by the National War Labor Board.
This inconsistency in the agency interpretations was emphasized
both by Judge Learned Hand in the lower court188 and in the
opinion of Justice J ackson.189
Another case where the inconsistency of administrative interpretations was of influence in leading the Court not to apply the
doctrine of limited review is Social Security Board v. Nierotko 190a decision which, almost more than any other, has defied analysis
186 60 F. Supp. 539 at 540-541.
187 Supra note 157.
188 154 F. (2d) 785 at 789.
189 328 U.S. 275 at 290, 66 S.Ct. 1105
100 327 U.S. 358, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946).

(1946).
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in terms of the Gray v. Powell doctrine. In the Nierotko case,
respondent was found by the National Labor Relations Board to
have been wrongfully discharged for union activity by his employer and was reinstated by that Board in his employment with
directions for "back pay" for the period of his discharge. The
"back pay" was paid by the employer. Thereafter respondent
requested the Social Security Board to credit him in the sum of
the "back pay" on his Old Age and Survivor's Insurance account
with the Board. The Board refused to credit the "back pay" as
wages. The Court set aside the Board's decision, holding that the
"back pay" was wages within the meaning of the relevant statute.
In its Nierotko decision, the Court was plainly substituting its
judgment for that of the Social Security Board. ". . . We think it
plain," said Justice Reed, "that an individual ... who receives
'back pay' for a period of time during which he was ·wrongfully
separated from his job, is entitled to have that award of back pay
treated as wages .... " 191 The administrative decision to the contrary, declared the opinion, is "unsound."192
The seeming inconsistency between the Court's approach in
Nierotko and Gray v. Powell is, if anything, increased, rather
than diminished, by Justice Reed's attempt to distinguish the
Gray v. Powell line of cases. To the argument that National Labor
Relations Board v. Hearst Publications193 and Gray v. Powell required the Court to uphold the agency interpretation, Justice
Reed stated, "Administrative determinations must have a basis
in law and must be within the granted authority."194 Yet, as
Professor Davis aptly points out, "The same remark, of course,
would be equally applicable to both GraY. v. Powell and the Hearst
case, but the validity of the remark did not prevent the Court in
those cases from limiting its inquiry to 'rational basis' of the administrative interpretation."195 Justice Reed went on to say that
the Board's interpretation went beyond the statutory limits, declaring in an already-cited passage, "An agency may not finally decide
the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function." 196
But the same could be said of most cases which follow the Gray v.
Powell doctrine. As has already been emphasized, the agency's
191 Id. at 364.
192 Id. at 367.
193 Supra note 78.
194 327 U.S. 358 at 369 (1946).
195 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 909-910 (1951).
196 327 U.S. 358 at 369, 66 S.Ct. 637 (1946).
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statutory jurisdiction will normally depend upon its proper application of the terms contained in its enabling legislation. And,
under Gray v. Powell, the agency itself may consequently be vested
with the authority all but finally to decide the limits of its statutory power.
Despite the weakness of the Court's attempt to explain its
Nierotko decision, it should be pointed out that there was present
in that case a factor which might well lead to the judicial refusal
to apply the Gray v. Powell doctrine, namely, that of conflicting
agency interpretations. The Social Security Board, in holding
that "back pay" was not wages, had relied upon the definition in
the Social Security Act of wages as "remuneration for employment"
and employment as "any service . : . performed ... by an employee
for his employer.... " 197 The Board urged that respondent did
not perform any service for the "back pay" received by him. The
Court, however, referred to the fact that both the Social Security
Board itself and other agencies had treated payments made by
employers, for which no specific services had been performed, as
wages. Thus, a regulation of the Social Security Board had characterized vacation allowances as wages, and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue had classified dismissal pay, vacation allowances, and sick
pay, as well as amounts paid employees during absence on jury
service, as wages.198 These interpretations, which are inconsistent
with that made by the Board in the Nierotko case,19 9 would seem
to be reason enough for the Court not to limit its review by the
Gray v. Powell doctrine. Unless the administrative experts themselves are consistent in their interpretations, reviewing courts need
not, even under Gray v. Powell, defer to them.200
A variation of the problem of conflicting interpretations on
the part of different agencies has been presented since 1947 in
cases involving the National Labor Relations Board. Under the
Taft-Hartley Act of that year, 201 the Board was, in effect, split into
197 49 Stat. L. 625 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§409, 410.
198 327 U.S. 358 at 366 (1946).
199 It should also be pointed out that the National Labor Relations Board, in NLRB
v. Killoren, (8th Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 609, had argued tha "back pay" constituted wages
in a bankruptcy cas!!. This was of influence in inducing the court of appeals to decide as
it did in Nierotko. (6th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 273 at 277.
200 The Court in Nierotko was also aided by the fact that both the Social Security
Board and the Department of Justice indicated that they were not sure that the Board's
interpretation was sound, even if the statute compelled it. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 910, n. 178 (1951).
20161 Stat. L. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §153.
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two more or less separate agencies, with powers of investigation
and prosecution being vested in the independent Office of the General Counsel, while the Board itself was left only with powers of
hearing and decision. Are the General Counsel and the Board
to be treated today like two separate agencies, if their interpretations of the statute conflict, for purposes of applying the doctrine of
Gray v. Powell? The answer to this question should depend upon
the actual extent of the separation between the Counsel and the
Board. If they are, in fact, really two distinct agencies-each with
its separate functions to perform and not subject to each other's
control-then there would seem to be no real reason why they
should not be so treated, insofar as the Gray v. Powell doctrine is
concerned.
As the Taft-Hartley provisions have worked out, it seems not
unfair to conclude that there has been, in practical effect, a division
of the Labor Board into two separate agencies. It is true that, in
form, the separation has not been as complete as it would have
been had the Board's investigating and prosecuting functions been
transferred to the Department of Justice. 202 In substance, however, the General Counsel has been given authority independent
of the Board, and the post-1947 conflicts between the Board and
the Counsel show how real the latter's independence has actually
been.
Since the NLRB and the General Counsel are, in fact, if not in
form, separate agencies, there is good reason for treating them as
such for the purposes of applying Gray v. Powell. Since both the
Counsel and the Board are now the administrative experts in the
field of labor relations, their constructions of the relevant statute
should not conflict, if there is to be the consistency in administrative interpretations required for the doctrine of limited review
to apply. If, on the contrary, their interpretations are inconsistent, the considerations discussed in connection with cases like
Social Security Board v. Nierotko 203 should govern.
A Supreme Court decision involving a post-Taft-Hartley review of the NLRB which is explainable, if at all, only upon the
above basis is National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park
Manufacturing Co.204 In that case, the Board had entertained a
complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against
202 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 399
203 Supra note 190.
204 341 U.S. 322, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951).

(1951).
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respondent and ordered respondent to bargain with that union.
At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers
Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations
and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the nonCommunist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley Act, the officers
of the CIO at that time had not. The statute provides that "No
investigation shall be made by the Board. . . , no petition under
section 9 (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on fiJe
with the Board an affidavit executed . . . by each officer of such
labor organization and the officers of any national or international
labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that
he is not a member of the Communist Party.... " 205 The order
was challenged upon the ground, among others, that the failure
of the CIO officers to file non-Communist affidavits disabled its
affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not entertain their complaint and enter the order.
The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the court of
appeals, 206 held that the NLRB could not, in these circumstances,
entertain the complaint. The Board had based its action upon the
view that the use of the adjectives "national" and "international"
in the statutory provision excluded the CIO, because it is regarded in labor circles as a federation ratl).er than a national or
international union. And, said the Board, on review, its finding
that the CIO did not come within the statutory term "national
or international labor organization" was subject only to the limited
review permitted by the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. The Court
rejected this claim and decided, on its own independent judgment,
that the CIO came within the statutory term.
It is clear from the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter207
that the Board's finding was at least a reasonable one. Why then
did not the Court uphold the finding under Gray v. Powell?
Justice Jackson's majority opinion gives two answers. In the first
place, said he, "here there is no question of fact." 208 But it has
been settled from the beginning that the Gray v. Powell doctrine
applies to agency applications of statutory terms to undisputed
205 61 Stat. L. 146
206 (4th Cir. 1950)
201 341 U.S. 322 at
20s Id. at 325.

(1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159h (emphasis added).
184 F. (2d) 98.
327, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951).
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facts. 209 And, even more important, said Justice Jackson, the
question at issue is one of law upon which the very power of the
agency depends. "An issue of law of this kind, which goes to the
heart of the validity of the proceedings on which the order is based,
is open to inquiry by the courts when they are asked to lend their
enforcement powers to an administrative tribunal." 210 Yet that,
as we have seen, can also be said of most of the cases where the
Court followed Gray v. Powell. As Justice Douglas expressed it
in a separate dissent, "In situations no more difficult than this we
have taken the administrative construction of statutory words.
Until today the test has been not whether the construction would
be our own if we sat as the Board, but whether it has a reasonable
basis in custom, practice, or legislative history." 211
Despite the fact that the reasons given by Justice Jackson do
not really distinguish Highland Park from Gray v. Powell, it is the
opinion of the present writer that the Court was correct in its
refusal to follow the doctrine of limited review. And that is the
case because there was, in actuality, a conflict in agency interpretations present in the Highland Park case. The General Counsel of
the Board had ruled that the Board could not entertain a complaint under these circumstances; but the Board, with one member
dissenting, overruled him. As has been pointed out, the NLRB
and the General Counsel have, since the Taft-Hartley Act, been in
substance two separate agencies. When they conflict in their interpretations, there is lacking the consistency in administrative expertise to which the courts should make the Gray v. Powell type
of deference. And, if that is true, Highland Park can rightly be
treated like cases such as the already-discussed Fishgold 212 and
Nierotko cases.213
200 In Gray v. Powell itself, indeed, there was no dispute as to the facts. And see
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 at 478, 67 S.Ct. 801 (1947), where the
Court expressly stated that the basic facts were undisputed in this type of case.
210 341 U.S. 322 at 326, 71 S.Ct. 758 (1951).
211 Id. at 327-328.
212 Supra notes 157 and 187.
213 Supra note 190. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, supra note 164, presents another
variation of the problem of conflicting agency interpretations. The holding of the Federal
Price Administrator there that petitioner was not a "public utility" and hence not exempt
from the federal price control law was contrary to the view taken by the relevant California regulatory agency which had consistently treated petitioner as a "public utility."
The fact that the conflicting interpretation was by a state, rather than a federal, agency
should make no difference so far as the applicability of Gray v. Powell is concerned,
provided that the state agency has jurisdiction to make such interpretation.
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Unreasonable findings. Some of the Supreme Court decisions
refusing to uphold agency findings of the Gray v. Powell type are
explainable on the simple ground that the findings upset were not
only wrong but unreasonable. Such cases are not inconsistent with
the Gray v. Powell doctrine, for, even under it, the reviewing court
can reverse where the challenged finding is seen not to have a
rational basis.
These cases are easy to deal with where the Court tells us expressly that the finding upset was unreasonable. Such a case is
United States v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers. 214 It involved a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act exempting from regulation
by the Interstate Commerce Commission "the operations of a shipper, or a group or association of shippers, in consolidating or distributing freight for themselves or for the members thereof, on a
nonprofit basis, for the purpose of securing the benefits of carload,
truckload, or other volume rates...." 215 In the instant case, the
ICC had held not entitled to this exemption an association of
wholesale automobile parts dealers organized and operated in good
faith, on a nonprofit basis, for the purpose of effecting savings in
freight charges for its members by securing the benefits of carload,
truckload, or other volume rates. On the facts presented, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court216 that the ICC action
was "without rational basis." The Court considered as decisive
that no shipments by the association were ever undertaken except
at the behest and for the benefit of a member. Looking to the
agency between member and association, the Court saw no reasonable ground for ruling that the association was on a profit basis, or
that it was holding its service out to the general public.217 That
being the case, the commission order had to be set aside, even
under Gray v. Powell.
More difficult to deal with are cases where the Court does not
expressly avow that the challenged agency findings are without a
rational basis. A recent case of this type is Thompson v. United
States,218 where the Court set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission finding that a "through route" existed between two points and directing the appellant railroad to provide
214 338 U.S. 689, 70 S.Ct. 411 (1950).
215 56 Stat. L. 285 (1942), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §1002 (c) (1).
216 Pacific Coast Wholesalers' Assn. v. United States, (D.C.
217 338 U.S. 689 at 691, 70 S.Ct. 411 (1950).
21s 343 U.S. 549, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952).

Cal. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 991.
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transportation over that route. 219 The Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Vinson, held that the Interstate Commerce Commission had erred in finding that there was a "through route" in existence in the instant case. "We hold that the Commission's efforts
to support its finding that a through route from Lenora to Omaha
via the Burlington line already exists are inconsistent with the
meaning of the term 'through route' as used in the Interstate Commerce Act. " 220 What may seem like an arbitrary refusal to follow
Gray v. Powell is, however, explained by the fact that, as Chief
Justice Vinson explained in a companion case, no traffic whatever
passed over the route found by the commission to constitute the
already-existing "through route." 221 Under these circumstances,
the ICC's finding appears patently unreasonable, and hence subject to being set aside, regardless of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell.
Other decisions of the highest Court which set aside agency
findings of the Gray v. Powell type are also explainable, if at all, on
the ground that the findings in question were unreasonable. In
Norton v. Warner Co.,222 for example, compensation had been
awarded under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act2 23 to one employed as a boatman on a barge which
at the time of the injury was afloat on the navigable waters of the
United States, despite the fact that the statute provided that it was
not to apply to a "master or member of a crew of any vessel." The
finding of the agency that the claimant did not come within the
statutory exception was clearly of the kind involved in Gray v.
Powell and, under that case, subject only to limited review. The
Supreme Court held nonetheless that it should be set aside. That
Justice Douglas tells us that his decision is based upon the principle that the courts can reverse because of an agency misconstruction of a term of the act224 is not very helpful, for the same can be
said in all the cases involving the Gray v. Powell doctrine. And
that would, of course, permit the courts to review the rightness of
agency constructions. At the same time, it seems to the present
219 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, a carrier must not only provide transportation service at reasonable rates over its own lines but has the additional duty "to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates ..•
applicable thereto." 54 Stat. L. 900 (1940), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §1 (4).
220 343 U.S. 549 at 560, 72 S.Ct. 978 (1952).
221 United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 343 U.S. 562 at 573, 72 S.Ct. 985 (1952).
222 321 U.S. 565, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944).
223 44 Stat. L. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §901.
224 321 U.S. 565 at 569, 64 S.Ct. 747 (1944). See Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 at 334, 74
S.Ct. 88 (1953).
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writer, that the Court felt that, under the facts of the case, the
agency finding was unreasonable. "If a barge . . . can have a
'crew' within the meaning of the Act and if a 'crew' may consist of
one man, we do not see why Rusin does not meet the requirements.... We know of no reason why a person in sole charge of
a vessel on a voyage is not as much a 'member of the crew' as he
would be if there were two or more aboard."225 That being true,
said Justice Douglas, "We conclude that only by a distorted definition of the word 'crew' as used in the Act could [the claimant be
excluded from the term]." 226
A more recent case involving the same judicial approach is
Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co.227 That case too grew out
of a claim for compensation under the Longshoremen's Act. The
relevant section of that statute provides, "The right to compensation for disability under this 'Act shall be barred unless !1- claim
therefor is filed within one year after the injury...." 228 The claims
here involved were filed from eighteen to twenty-four months
from the dates the employees were injured. The deputy commissioner held that the claims were nevertheless timely, since they
had been filed within one year after the claimants had become
disabled because of their injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed
decisions below vacating the award. 229 A reading of Justice Minton's opinion leaves one with the impression that he felt that the
agency finding, which construed the word "injury" in the statute
to mean "disability" was not only not right, but also not reasonable. "We are not free," said he, "under the guise of construction, to amend the statute by inserting therein before the word
'injury' the word 'compensable' so as to make 'injury' read as if
it were 'disability.' Congress knew the difference between 'disability' and 'injury' and used the words advisedly."23 ° For the
agency to construe the two terms as interchangeable despite the
fact that each was expressly defined differently in the statute231
was for it to act without a rational basis.

Primary role of lower courts. A Supreme Court decision which
appears, at first glance, to be wholly inconsistent with the doctrine
of Gray v. Powell is National Labor Relations Board v. American
225 321 U.S. 565 at 571.
226 Id. at 573.
227 342 U.S. 197, 72 S.Ct. 233 (1952).
22s 44 Stat. L. 1432, §13 (a) (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §913 (a).
229 (9th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 987; (D.C. Cal. 1950) 92 F.
230 342 U.S. 197 at 199, 72 S.Ct. 233 (1952).
23144 Stat. L. 1425 (1927), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §902 (2), (10).

Supp. 898.
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Insurance Co.232 The NLRB there had found that respondent
had not bargained in "good faith" with its employees' representative, as was required by the Labor Act, as amended, 233 and
ordered respondent so to bargain. The court of appeals, upon
review, refused to enforce this portion of the Board's order, since
it found that there had been no bad faith on respondent's part.234
A reading of Chief Judge Hutcheson's opinion reveals no indication of any deference paid to the Board's application of the statutory term "good faith" to the facts of the case, as is required by
Gray v. Powell. The court seems rather to have substituted its
judgment for that of the Board, whose finding was set aside as
incorrect.
Despite this apparent violation by the court of appeals of the
Gray v. Powell doctrine, its refusal to enforce the Board brder ·was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Vinson admitted
that the agency finding at issue involved the application of the
statutory standard of good faith bargaining to the facts of this
case.235 But, said he, the rule of National Labor Relations Board
v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co.236 requires the Court to affirm. In the
Pittsburgh S. S. case, the Court had indicated that the lower
federal courts were henceforth to have the primary role in reviewing administrative action. Were he called to pass upon the administrative findings in the first instance, said Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the Pittsburgh S. S. opinion, or to make an
independent review of the review by the court of appeals, he might
well support the Board's conclusion and reject that of the court
below. But Congress has charged the courts of appeals, not the
Supreme Court, with the normal and primary responsibility of
review. This is not the place to review a conflict of evidence nor
to reverse the court of appeals because "were we in its place we
would find the record tilting one way rather than the other, though
fair-minded judges could find it tilting either way." 237 Or, to put
it another way, henceforth the same degree of finality that is
accorded to administrative findings by the courts of appeals will
be accorded to the determinations of such courts on review by
the Supreme Court.
In its American Insurance decision, the Court applied the
Pittsburgh S. S. rule to the Gray v. Powell type of case. "We
232 343

U.S. 395, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952).
61 Stat. L. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d).
234 (5th Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 307.
235 343 U.S. 395 at 409, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952).
236 340 U.S. 498, 71 S.Ct. 453 (1951).
237 Id. at 503.

233

60

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

repeat and reaffirm this rule," stated Chief Justice Vinson, "noting its special applicability to cases where, as here, a statutory
standard such as 'good faith' can have meaning only in its application to the particular facts of a particular case." 238
The American Insurance case is consequently not inconsistent
with Gray v. Powell. Instead, it tells us that the application of the
doctrine of that case, like the application of the substantial-evidence rule under the celebrated Universal Camera case239 is now
the primary responsibility of the courts before whom review actions
are brought initially. Unless their decisions on review are unreasonable, they will not be judicially interfered with from above.
This is true even though the highest Court itself would have
decided differently, had it been the original reviewing court.
A more recent case explainable on the same basis as American
Insurance is Thompson v. Lawson.240 It involved a claim for a
death benefit by an alleged "widow" under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The claim was denied
by the deputy commissioner who found that the claimant was not
the "widow" of the decedent. The lower courts affirmed241 and
their decisions were upheld by the Supreme Court. In a dissent,
Justice Black asserted that the Court's decision was, in effect,
contrary to Gray v. Powell. He based his view upon the fact that
the deputy commissioner had entered his order against the claimant because he felt bound by prior holdings of the Fifth Circuit
that an attempted marriage by a wife barred her recovery of compensation as a matter of law.242 Justice Black would have reversed
with directions to remand the cause to the deputy commissioner
to determine, free from judicial compulsion, whether, as a fact,
petitioner's living apart was for "justifiable cause" or on account
of her husband's "desertion." The decision of the Court, said he,
nullified the primary right of the agency to apply the relevant
statutory term to the facts of the case. "That the Court treats its
holding as one of statutory1 construction cannot obscure the actual
effect of what it is doing. The Court is taking from the deputy
commissioners their congressionally granted power to determine
from all, the facts and circumstances whether a widow is entitled
to compensation."243
238 343 U.S. 395 at 410, 72 S.Ct. 824 (1952).
239 Supra note 48.
240 347 U.S. 334, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954).
241 (5th Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 527.
242 347 U.S. 334 at 338, 74 S.Ct. 555 (1954).
243 Id. at 339.
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Yet, even if Justice Black is correct in his view that the lower
courts had refused to give the required deference to the agency
findings, it does not follow from this that the Supreme Court must
reverse. Under the American Insurance case, on the contrary, the
decision of the original reviewing court must be affirmed, even if
it involves an incorrect application of Gray v. Powell, provided
that it is not unreasonable. Since, as Justice Black himself admitted,244 the evidence was such that a finding either way could
fairly have been made, the decision of the original reviewing court
cannot be characterized as without a rational basis.
Converse of Gray v. Powell. In Gray v. Powell, we have emphasized, the agency finding was one upon which its jurisdiction
depended. Unless the petitioners in that case were not "producers," the agency was wholly without regulatory power over
them. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 245 indicates that the
doctrine of Gray v. Powell does not apply to the converse type of
case, i.e., one where an agency decides that it does not have jurisdiction over a particular individual and its decision is based upon
a Gray v. Powell type finding.
In the Phillips Petroleum case, the Federal Power Commission
had found that the Phillips Company was not a "natural-gas"
company within the meaning of that term as used in its enabling
statute246 and therefore not within the commission's jurisdiction
over rates. It consequently refused to proceed with an investigation it had instituted into the reasonableness of the rates charged
by Phillips. In the Supreme Court, it was contended that the
FPC's finding had·a reasonable basis in law and was supported by
substantial evidence and therefore should be upheld under Gray
v. Powell. That the commission finding was, at the very least,
reasonable is shown by the fact that three dissenting justices in
the Supreme Court247 thought that it was right. The majority
of the Court nonetheless held that the FPC finding must be set
aside as erroneous. The implication is that the Gray v. Powell
doctrine will not be applied in such a case.248 Where the administrative finding is one upon which the agency grounds a decision to assert its authority, the courts will defer to its judgment
244 Id. at 338.
245 347 U.S. 672, 74 S.Ct. 794 (1954).
246 52 Stat. L. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §717.
247 Justices Douglas, Clark, and Burton.
248 The decision of the Supreme Court can also be

justified by the rule of the American Insurance case, supra note 232, since it was affirming the decision of the court of
appeals. And it should also be noted that the Court was influenced by the fact that the
Federal Power Commission had been inconsistent in its interpretations of the statutory
term at issue. 347 U.S. 672 at 678.
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that regulatory power should be asserted. Where on the other
hand, the administrative decision is one which declines jurisdiction, the Phillips Petroleum case indicates that the courts may
review fully the finding upon which the agency abnegation is
based.
Other cases. Two Supreme Court decisions involving the
application of the Gray v. Powell doctrine cannot be explained on
any of the grounds discussed above. The first of them is Railroad
Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co.249 The Railroad
Retirement Act of 1937250 established a system of annuity, pension, and death benefits for employees of designated classes of
employers. The Railroad Retirement Board adjudicates claims
of eligible employees for the various types of benefits created by
the act. The eligibility of an employee for such benefits is based
on service to those included in the act's definition of "employer."
The question arose whether the Duquesne Warehouse Co. was
such an "employer." The Board after a hearing found that it was.
Duquesne brought suit in the district court to compel the Board
to set aside its order. That court rendered judgment for Duquesne.251 The court of appeals affirmed, by a divided vote.252
The Supreme Court, in reversing the decisions below, made
no mention whatsoever of the doctrine of Gray v. Powell or any
of the cases following it. Instead, the opinion of Justice Douglas
analyzes the statutory provisions and the facts and concludes, without really referring to the agency finding or the deference to be
paid to it, that the services performed by Duquesne made it an
"employer" under the relevant act. Yet it seems clear, as Professor
Davis points out, that this case is exactly like the already-discussed
Hearst case,253 where the Court applied the Gray v. Powell doctrine to review of a National Labor Relations Board finding that
certain newsboys were "employees." "The question whether warehouse services were 'in connection with . . . transportation' seems
analytically the same as the question whether newsboys were 'employees.' Both cases involved interpretation of statutory limitations
on administrative jurisdiction. Both cases involved application of
statutory language to undisputed facts. No reason appears for
believing that the agency was more competent, or the Court less
competent, to decide whether newsboys were employees than to
249 326 U.S. 446, 66 S.Ct. 238 (1946).
250 50 Stat. L. 307 (1937), 45 U.S.C. (1952) §228a.

251 Duquesne Warehouse

Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board, (D.C. N.Y. 1944) 56 F.
Supp. 87.
252 (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 473.
253 Supra note 78.
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decide whether the warehouse service was in connection with transportation. Yet the scope of the judicial inquiry was apparently
different in the two cases."254 Professor Davis's analysis seems incontrovertible. But the Court in the Duquesne Warehouse case
did not, as has been shown, appear to follow the doctrine of limited
review or even refer to the Hearst case or Gray v. Powell at all.
What makes the Court's failure to mention the Gray v. Powell
doctrine even more aggravating 'is the fact that, in the court of
appeals, there had been an intense dispute precisely over that
doctrine. The majority opinion by Judge Hutcheson simply refused to apply Gray v. Powell and similar cases so as to limit its
review of the agency finding at issue. The contention of the Board
that those cases required its finding to be upheld if it had only a
rational basis was rejected as "heresy."255 Judge Frank, who dissented, urged the applicability of the Hearst case.256 Despite the
sharpness of the disagreemen_t below, the Supreme Court decided
as it did, without any reference to Gray v. Powell, Hearst, or the
dispute in the lower court itself-which, one would think, the
Court would have felt called upon expressly to resolve.
A case where the Court followed the same unsatisfactory approach as in its Duquesne Warehouse decision is Board of Governors v. Agnew.251 It involved review of an order of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System removing respondents
from office as directors of a national bank on the ground that they
were employees of a firm "primarily engaged" in underwriting
within the meaning of the relevant section of the Banking Act of
1933.258 Respondents were employees of a firm which received a
substantial proportion of its ,income from underwriting, although
its income from that source was never more than 39 percent of its
total income. The court of appeals had set aside the Board's order
on the ground that, since the firm's underwriting business did not
by any quantitative test exceed 50 percent of its total business,
it could not properly be found to be "primarily engaged" in the
underwriting business.259
The Supreme Court reversed, but, as in the Duquesne Warehouse case, it did not confine itself to the question of whether
the agency finding had a rational basis. Instead, it seems to have
254 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 889 (1951).
255148 F. (2d) 473 at 477. It is interesting to note that Jaffe, "Judicial Review:
'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,'" 64 HARV. L. REv. 1233 at 1258 (1951), has
used the same characterization.
256 148 F. (2d) 473 at 486-487.
257 329 U.S. 441, 67 S.CL 411 (1946).
258 48 Stat. L. 162 at 194 (1933), 12 U.S.C. (1952) §78.
259 Agnew v. Board of Governors, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 785.
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substituted its judgment for that of the agency on the question
whether a company less than half of whose business was underwriting was "primarily engaged in ... underwriting." 260 According to Justice Douglas, "If the underwriting business of a firm is
substantial, the firm is engaged in the underwriting business in a
primary way, though by any quantitative test underwriting may
not be its chief or principal activity. On the facts in this record
we would find it hard to say that underwriting was not one primary
activity of the firm." 261 As was true in·Duquesne Warehouse, the
Court's opinion nowhere refers to the doctrine of limited review
or the Gray v. Powell line of cases.
That the Court in the Agnew case was not following the Gray
v. Powell doctrine of limited review is shown by the concurring
opinion of Justice Rutledge. Like the majority of the Court,
he agreed that the agency, rather than the lower court, should be
upheld. He objected, however, to the implication of full review
contained in the majority opinion. ·..1 think it important ...,"
said he, "to make clear that my concurrence in the Court's disposition of the case is based upon the ground I have set forth, and
not upon independent judicial determination of the question presented on the merits. I do not think this Court or any other should
undertake to reconsider, as an independent judgment, the Board's
determination upon that question or similar ones likely to arise,
if the Board was not without basis in fact for its judgment and
does not clearly transgress a statutory mandate." 262
In both the Duquesne Warehouse and Agnew cases, it should
be noted, the Supreme Court upheld agency findings which had
been reversed by courts of appeals. It may well be that the Court
felt called upon to demonstrate, not only the reasonableness, but
also the rightness of the challenged findings because of this fact. 263
The lower courts had held that an independent warehouse company could not be found to be an "employer" under the Railroad
Retirement Act nor could a firm, less than half of. whose business
was in underwriting, be found to be "primarily engaged" in underwriting. In view of these express court of appeals decisions, the
260 See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
261 329 U.S. 441 at 446, 67 S.Ct. 411
262 Id. at 451. According to Black,

897 (1951).
(1946).
J., dissenting, in Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 at
484, 72 S.Ct. 433 (1952), that case also involved an unjustified refusal by the Court to
follow the Gray v. Powell doctrine. It seems to the present writer, however, that that
doctrine was not relevant in the Stark case, which involved the question of whether the
enabling act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to deduct certain payments to cooperatives from the prices paid to milk producers.
263 It should, however, be pointed out that in Gray v. Powell itself, the Court also
upheld an agency finding which bad been reversed by the court of appeals. Yet this did
not lead the Court to grant other than limited review there.
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highest Court may have felt it necessary to show, not only that
the agency constructions of the acts were reasonable, but also that
it would have construed the statutes similarly had the cases originally come before it. Thus, the Court in the Agnew case was
showing, to use its own words, that the agency construction of
the act "is, we think, not only permissible but also more consonant
with the legislative purpose than the construction which the Court
of Appeals adopted." 264
Yet, even if the above explains why the Court acted as it did
in Duquesne Warehouse and Agnew, it is difficult to see why the
doctrine of Gray v. Powell was referred to in neither case. If the
Court was consciously adhering to that doctrine while, at the
same time, stating in detail its agreement with the correctness of
the administrative findings in order to buttress the agencies, whose
views had been rejected below, with the express accord of the nation's highest tribunal, 265 it would certainly seem reasonable to
expect the Court to tell us so. And this was particularly true in
the Duquesne Warehouse case where, as we have seen, there was
a sharp division in the court of appeals on the applicability and,
indeed, even on the validity of the Gray v. Powell doctrine. That
the Supreme Court, on the contrary, said nothing about that doctrine or the cases following it may indicate that it was actually
doing what it seemed to be doing in Duquesne Warehouse and
Agnew-namely, fully reviewing the challenged agency findings.
Yet if that is true, those cases are most disconcerting, because they
do not contain any factors, such as those already discussed, which
appear to differentiate them from Gray v. Powell. In the absence
of any explanation by the Court to the contrary, we must conclude that they constitute mere aberrations from the Gray v.
Powell doctrine. Nor should their practical importance, at least
in their specific effects, be overemphasized. Both cases reached
the same result as that required under Gray v. Powell, i.e., the
upholding of the agency findings.

Conclusion
In a recent article, Professor Jaffe has rejected the Gray v.
Powell doctrine as "heresy." Referring to Gray v. Powell and the
329 U.S. 441 at 447 (1946) .
Such an approach may also explain an aspect of the Hearst case, supra note 78,
that has troubled commentators, namely, the lengthy dissertation by the Court there in
the first portion of its opinion to demonstrate its concurrence with the agency view that its
finding on the question whether newsboys were "employees" under the relevant statute
need not necessarily be governed by the common-law test to determine the existence of
an employment relationship. Since the court of appeals had held in that case that the
common-law test was controlling, the Court may have felt it desirable to state expressly
264

.265
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H earst266 and Dobson 261 cases, he states, "There are expressions
in these cases which suggest that Congress, merely by the use of
a 'broad statutory term' to be applied from case to case, ,has thereby delegated to the agency the power to determine what considerations are relevant in applying it. In this connection it is of course
admitted that if the concept of relevancy which is chosen is unreasonable the courts may censor it. But it is said that if the judgment is reasonable the courts are powerless to interfere, though
independently they would have arrived at a different conclusion.
This, in my opinion, is heresy."268
It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the present writer shares
Professor Jaffe's view. The doctrine of Gray v. Powell is inconsistent with the very basis of the law of judicial review in the
Anglo-American world. From almost the beginning of our administrative law, review has focussed upon two main questions:
that of jurisdiction and that of proper application of the law.
The courts have left questions of fact for the administrator, subject only to limited review. Ensuring that agencies remain within
the limits of their delegated powers and that they have not misconstrued the law has, on the contrary, been conceived of as a
judicial function. Yet, under Gray v. Powell, both statutory construction and the determination of agency jurisdiction are taken
from the reviewing court and vested primarily in the administrator.
Nor are the essential effects of the Gray v. Powell doctrine
altered by the characterization of a disputed agency finding as only
one of "fact"269 or as involving merely the application, and not
the interpretation, of a statute. Much as courts and commentators
may seek to obscure ·it, nothing they say can change_ the fact that
a finding like that at issue in Gray v. Powell has both legal and
factual elements. And, as a leading supporter of the doctrine of
limited review concedes, it does involve a question of statutory
interpretation. "Analytically, the question [in Gray v. Powell]
whether/Seaboard was a 'producer' was at least in part a question
not only of law but also of statutory interpretation-a question
of the meaning of the term 'producer.' " 270
that the agency was not only reasonable, but also right, in holding that the statute did not
import the common-law test.
266 Supra

note 78•
note 82.
,
.268 Jaffe, "Judicial Review: 'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record'," 64 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 1233 at 1258 (1951).
269 As was done by the Court in O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504, 71
S.Ct. 470 (1951).
270DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 883 (1951).
.267 Supra
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I

The proper approach to the Gray v. Powell type of finding is
that of the late Master of the Rolls in In re Butler,271 an important English case. At issue in it was an administrative finding
that certain buildings were "houses" rather than "other buildings," under the relevant section of the Housing Act, 1936.272
"It seems. to me," said Lord Greene in the course of his opinion,
"that these buildings properly fall under the word 'houses' in the
section. Whether a particular building does or does not fall under
that word is.a mixed question of law and fact; fact in so far as it
is necessary to ascertain all the relevant facts relating to the building, and law in so far as the application of the word 'houses' to
those facts involves the construction of the Act."273
Under Lord Greene's view, the reviewing court may use its own
independent judgment with regard to the application of the statutory term to the particular factual situation. Due weight is to be
given to the administrative ascertainment of the facts, but it is for
the court to determine whether those facts come within the statutory concept. This was the approach taken by the Master of the
Rolls in the Butler case, where he decided whether or not the buildings in question were "houses" on the basis of the facts as found by
the administrative body. "As so frequently happens in dealing with
Acts of Parliament, words are found used-and very often the commoner the word is, the greater doubt it may raise-the application
of which to individual cases can only be settled by the application
of a sense of language in the context of the Act, and if I may say
so, a certain amount of common sense in using and understanding
the English language in a particular context. There may, of course,
be cases which fall very near a borderline, and it is impossible to
lay down any exhaustive definition as to what is or is not a house.
Every case must be considered in the light of its own facts, but in
the present case I am of opinion that these buildings come under
the word 'houses.' " 274 To the present writer, at least, the approach
of Lord Greene seems far preferable to that followed by our Supreme Court in the Gray v. Powell line of cases.
While the judicial refusal in this country to concede that statutory interpretation is involved in the Gray v. Powell type of case
cannot obscure the fact that such interpretation is involved, it
must be conceded that it has enabled the highest Court to all but
271 [1939] 1 K.B. 570.
27226 Geo. V and 1 Edw.

VIII, c. 51, §25.
[1939] 1 K.B. 570 at 579.
274lbid.
273
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nullify language in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946275
which can be said to eliminate the Gray v. Powell doctrine. Under
that statute, "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret ... statutory provisions."276 Since, as has
already been shown, the Gray v. Powell type of finding does contain legal elements and involves statutory interpretation, it can be
claimed that this provision of the procedure act eliminates the
doctrine of narrow review in the Gray v. Powell situation.277 The
Suprem_e Court has, however, avoided this result by its refusal to
concede that an agency finding of the kind under discussion involves statutory interpretation. In O'Leary v. Brown-PacificMaxon, Inc.,21 8 on the contrary, the Court held that a finding that
a death arose "out of and in the course of employment" was one
of "fact," whose review was governed by the substantial-evidence
rule. By its use of its power to classify challenged agency findings,
the Court has been able to maintain the Gray v. Powell doctrine
unaltered, despite the seemingly contrary language of the Administrative Procedure Act.279
It must, of course, be emphasized that the question of the desirability of the Gray v. Powell doctrine and that of its application are
two entirely different things. Even if, like the present writer, one
doubts the soundness of the doctrine and hopes for its ultimate
repudiation, he can still desire, so long as it is not overruled, ~o see
it applied in a logically consistent fashion. To one concerned with
the law, not necessarily as pure logic, but at least as a rational science, there is nothing more disconcerting than a doctrine which is
sometimes followed and sometimes not, with the choice in particular cases dependent more or less upon judicial caprice.
That is why the embarrassingly large number of Supreme Court
decisions that do not adhere to the doctrine of Gray v. Powell is of
275 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001.
276 Section 10 (e).
277 See, e.g., DICKINSON, THE JUDICIAL REvrEW PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL ADMINIS·
TRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr (SECTION 10): BACKGROUND AND EFFECT, IN THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 546, 585, Warren ed. (1947).
278 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470 (1951).
279 The ineffectiveness of the Administrative Procedure Act in doing away with the
Gray v. Powell doctrine has led the Hoover Commission task force on administrative law
to recommend in its recent report that that act be amended to allow the reviewing court
to "determine all relevant. questions of law and interpret any constitutional and statutory
provisions involved, and it shall apply such determination to the facts duly found or
established, whether or not such court is the trier of the facts." COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 218, 374 (1955). The Brown-Pacific-Maxon case would seem to indicate that some such amendment will be necessary before the Procedure Act will have any
real effect upon the doctrine of Gray v. Powell.
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such concern to the student of administrative law. Unless they
can be explained upon a rational basis, the law of his subject is, to
say the least, in a most unsatisfactory state.
In the analysis which has been given in this article of the decisions which do not appear to follow the Gray v. Powell doctrine,
it has, it is believed, been shown that the vast majority of those
decisions are not really inconsistent with Gray v. Powell. And that
is true because, in all but two of the decisions analyzed,280 there
were present factors which might logically induce the reviewing
court to decline to defer to the challenged agency finding. All of
these factors were logically inherent in Gray v. Powell itself as that
case was decided by the highest Court and the presence of any of
them in a case should make for the non-application of the doctrine
of limited review.
The cases which have been discussed indicate that the doctrine
of Gray v. Powell will not be followed:
1. Where the challenged agency finding has not been made in
a specific contested case after a full, formal adversary hearing.281
2. Where the challenged finding is inconsistent with other
administrative interpretations, whether made by the same or by
other agencies. 282
3. Where the finding at issue is one upon which the agency
bases a decision that it does not have jurisdiction in the particular
case.283
In addition, it should of course be realized that, even under the
doctrine of limited review, the courts can inquire into the reasonableness of challenged findings. Gray v. Powell type findings will
consequently be set aside, upon review,
4. Where the court finds that they are without a rational
basis.284
The American Insurance decision285 adds a further factor which
is needed to explain some of the recent Supreme Court cases, which
otherwise might seem inconsistent with Gray v. Powell. The highest Court will not reverse decisions below setting aside agency
findings
280 Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co., supra note 249, and
Board of Governors v. Agnew, supra note 257.
281 Pp. 39-45 supra.
282 Pp. 45-55 supra.
283 Pp. 61-62 supra.
284 Pp. 56-58 supra.
285 Note 232 supra.
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5. Where the action of the original reviewing court is reasonable, even though the Supreme Court itself, had the review action
come before it initially, would have upheld the agency finding
under the doctrine of Gray v. Powell. 286
The presence in them of one or more of the above-listed factors
explains the non-application of the doctrine of limited review in
practically all the cases which have been discussed. The use of
these factors to explain the judicial failure to follow Gray v. Powell
transforms the doctrine of that case from one whose application
depends on the vagaries of the highest Court to one which is applied in a more or less logical and consistent manner. And, if that
is the case, it is a doctrine which, whatever the doubts that one
may have as to its ultimate desirability, is a workable one whose
application or non-application can be predicted upon logical principles.
It is true that the criteria which have been emphasized in this
paper as those upon which the use of the Gray v. Powell doctrine
turns are not those which other writers on the subject have urged.
But it is also true that other writers have been able to explain only
a small proportion of the Supreme Court decisions which appear
inconsistent with Gray v. Powell, relegating the unexplained cases
to the limbo of uncontrolled judicial discretion. More disconcerting perhaps is the fact that the Supreme Court itself has not articulated the tests urged by the present writer as the factors which have
induced it not to follow the doctrine of limited review. The failure
of the Court itself to give any real explanation of its seemingly
arbitrary refusals to adhere to Gray v. Powell does, it must be conceded, make matters most difficult for those who seek to analyze
the jurisprudence of the highest tribunal. The Court's dereliction
does not, however, preclude attempts at such analysis by outside
observers. Nor are their analyses-otherwise workable-rendered
invalid because they do not coincide with what, if anything, the
Court has said on the subject. On the contrary, so far as the subject
under discussion in this article is concerned, it is almost essential
for the commentator to rely more upon his own analysis than upon
what little the Court has said. For, if one had to rely only upon
the Court's statements with regard to the application of the docrine of Gray v. Powell, he would most certainly have to declare,
with Mark Twain and Justice Jackson, "The more you explain it,
the more I don't understand it."
286

Pp. 58-61 supra.

